Central Africa·Democratic Republic of the Congo

Eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo / M23 Conflict

Also known as: North Kivu Insurgency; Kivu Conflict; Congo–Rwanda Conflict (2021–present); M23/AFC Insurgency

EscalatingInsurgencyCentral Africa2021–present (roots: 2012; broader Kivu conflicts since 1996)

An insurgency in eastern DRC driven by the M23 rebel movement and its political wing, the Alliance Fleuve Congo (AFC), with alleged Rwandan support, involving the capture of major cities and ongoing peace negotiations.

Background

The eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) has been the site of continuous armed conflict since the mid-1990s, rooted in the aftermath of the 1994 Rwandan genocide, which displaced over one million Hutu refugees into the then-Zaire. The First and Second Congo Wars (1996–97 and 1998–2003) drew nine African states and approximately 20 armed groups into conflict, resulting in an estimated 3 to 5.4 million deaths, predominantly from disease and displacement rather than direct violence, making it among the deadliest conflicts since the Second World War.

A 2002–2003 peace process formally ended the war and installed a transitional government, but eastern DRC—particularly North and South Kivu provinces and Ituri—has remained chronically unstable. An estimated 100 or more armed groups have operated in the region in the two decades since, competing over territory, ethnic grievances, and access to mineral wealth.

The Tutsi-led National Congress for the Defence of the People (CNDP) rebelled from 2006 to 2009 over the protection of Congolese Tutsi communities and the unimplemented integration of its fighters into the national army; a peace agreement signed on 23 March 2009 ended that rebellion and later gave the M23 movement its name. In April 2012, former CNDP fighters mutinied and formed the March 23 Movement (M23), which briefly captured Goma in November 2012 before withdrawing and being militarily defeated in 2013 by the Congolese army (FARDC) supported by a reinforced UN Force Intervention Brigade.

M23 remained largely dormant until late 2021, when it resumed attacks in North Kivu. By 2022–2025, the Congolese government, the UN Group of Experts on the DRC, and Western governments were documenting alleged Rwandan state support for the group, including the presence of embedded Rwanda Defence Force personnel. The movement's political wing, the Alliance Fleuve Congo (AFC), was established in 2023, broadening the insurgency's coalition and articulating explicitly political demands for governance change in Kinshasa.

Main Actors

Government: Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (President Félix Tshisekedi); Armed Forces of the DRC (FARDC)
Rebel / Insurgent: March 23 Movement (M23) and its political umbrella, the Alliance Fleuve Congo (AFC), led by Corneille Nangaa
Allied pro-government militias: Wazalendo (patriots) coalition of local self-defence militias; Burundian National Defence Force (deployed in South Kivu)
Other armed groups: Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR); Allied Democratic Forces / Islamic State Central Africa Province (ADF/ISCAP); CODECO (community militia in Ituri)
Regional peace forces: Southern African Development Community Mission in the DRC (SAMIDRC, 2023–2025, withdrawn after casualties); UN Organization Stabilization Mission in the DRC (MONUSCO)
External state (alleged): Rwanda (alleged military support to M23; Rwanda denies direct involvement; documented by UN Group of Experts, 2022–2025)

Drivers

External state intervention (alleged Rwandan support for M23)
Ethnic and communal identity (Congolese Tutsi grievances)
Governance failures and state fragility in eastern DRC
Natural resources (coltan, gold, tin — M23 controls Rubaya mine, supplying ~15% of global tantalum)
Unresolved integration of former CNDP fighters into FARDC
Historical grievances from the Second Congo War and genocide aftermath
Weak regional border security and porous international frontiers

Timeline

1994
Rwandan genocide displaces over 1 million Hutu refugees into then-Zaire, destabilising the eastern borderlands.
1996–2003
First and Second Congo Wars kill an estimated 3–5.4 million people; nine states intervene; UN Mission in DRC (MONUC) established.
23 March 2009
Peace agreement ends the CNDP rebellion; agreement later gives its name to the M23 movement.
April 2012
Former CNDP fighters mutiny and form M23, alleging the DRC government has failed to implement the 2009 agreement.
November 2012
M23 briefly captures Goma; withdraws following international pressure.
2013
M23 militarily defeated by FARDC and UN Force Intervention Brigade; movement enters dormancy.
Late 2021
M23 resurges in North Kivu; FARDC offensive fails to contain it.
2022–2023
UN Group of Experts documents alleged Rwandan Defence Force presence in M23 formations. AFC political wing formed by Corneille Nangaa (2023). SAMIDRC deployed by SADC.
January 2025
M23/AFC captures Goma; SAMIDRC troops killed. UNSC Resolution 2773 condemns the offensive.
February 2025
M23 captures Bukavu, capital of South Kivu.
June–July 2025
Washington Track: DRC–Rwanda peace framework initialled (27 June 2025).
15 November 2025
Doha Framework Agreement (8 protocols) signed between DRC and M23/AFC; only ceasefire-monitoring and prisoner-exchange protocols substantively implemented by mid-2026.
4 December 2025
Washington Accords signed by Presidents Tshisekedi and Kagame; covers Rwandan troop withdrawal, FDLR neutralisation, and minerals cooperation.
December 2025
M23 captures Uvira despite the peace agreements; 400+ killed, 200,000 displaced. M23 withdraws January 2026 under US pressure.
Mid-2026
Implementation of both Washington Accords and Doha Framework remains stalled. Rwandan withdrawal and FDLR disbandment unconfirmed. Fighting continues intermittently.

Humanitarian Impact

The M23 conflict operates within the context of what OCHA has described as one of the world's most severe humanitarian crises. As of mid-2026, more than 7 million people are internally displaced in the DRC nationally. The M23 offensive from late 2024 through early 2025 alone is estimated to have displaced between 500,000 and 4 million people depending on the assessment period and methodology. More than 1.1 million Congolese refugees are hosted in neighbouring countries, primarily Uganda, Burundi, and Tanzania.

UNICEF documented approximately 600 cases of sexual violence in the immediate aftermath of Goma's fall in January 2025. On 28 January 2026, a landslide at the Rubaya coltan mine—under M23 control—killed more than 200 people. UN agencies have documented systematic patterns of looting, sexual violence, and forced displacement associated with the advance of M23 and allied forces.

Peace Efforts

Nairobi Peace Process (EAC-led, 2022–2023): collapsed without agreement.
SAMIDRC deployment (SADC mission to DRC, 2023–2025): withdrawn following significant troop casualties. SADC engagement formally ended 2025.
Washington Track (US-facilitated, DRC–Rwanda): framework initialled 27 June 2025; Washington Accords signed 4 December 2025 (Tshisekedi and Kagame). Implementation stalled as of mid-2026.
Doha Track (Qatar-facilitated, DRC–M23/AFC): Declaration of Principles (19 July 2025); Framework Agreement with 8 protocols (15 November 2025). Only ceasefire-monitoring and prisoner-exchange protocols substantively agreed by mid-2026.
AU Mediation: Coordinated by 5 co-facilitators under Togolese President Faure Gnassingbé from late 2025.
MONUSCO: UN mandate renewed to December 2026 (UNSC Resolution 2808, 19 December 2025).

Current Situation

As of mid-2026, the eastern DRC conflict remains active and unresolved. Both the Washington Accords and the Doha Framework Agreement are in early implementation, with substantive provisions—Rwandan troop withdrawal, FDLR disbandment, territorial administration transfer—largely unimplemented. M23 and AFC retain administrative control over significant portions of North Kivu and South Kivu. Multiple ceasefire violations have been recorded since both agreements were signed. MONUSCO continues its mandate, and AU-led mediation persists under Togolese facilitation. The US has pursued a minerals-for-security framework with Kinshasa, listing the Rubaya coltan mine as a strategic asset in a bilateral minerals framework.

Outlook

The outlook remains precarious. Both diplomatic tracks face deep structural obstacles: the DRC government contests Rwandan military involvement, Rwanda denies it, and M23/AFC demands that remain explicitly political (governance change in Kinshasa) cannot be accommodated without transformative domestic political arrangements that neither party has clearly committed to. The FDLR—whose neutralisation is a core Rwandan demand and a Doha protocol provision—retains cohesion and operational capacity in South Kivu, making any rapid disbandment improbable. The minerals dimension of the Washington framework introduces a US commercial interest that may sustain diplomatic attention but also creates incentives for continued strategic ambiguity. Absent a comprehensive, implemented political settlement addressing underlying sovereignty disputes, ethnic protection concerns, and governance of natural resources, the risk of renewed large-scale hostilities remains high.

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Related CRCA Resources

ACRI 2026 DRC Country Risk Profile (forthcoming)
APCO 2026 Central Africa Regional Chapter
CRCA Armed Groups Directory: M23/AFC entry (forthcoming)
CRCA Peace Agreements Database: Washington Accords 2025 (forthcoming)

Citation

Centre for Research on Conflict in Africa (CRCA). (2026). Eastern DRC / M23 Conflict. CRCA Encyclopedia of Conflict, Peace and Security. https://crcahub.org/encyclopedia/eastern-drc-m23

Editorial Metadata

Version: 1.0 (Pilot)
Editor: CRCA–ACAN Editorial Team
Status: Pilot entry — full peer review pending
Sources updated: 21 June 2026
Next review: December 2026

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