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North Africa, with significant overlap into the Horn of Africa; classification varies by institution·Sudan

Sudan Civil War (2023–present)

Also known as: Sudan War; Sudanese Civil War; SAF–RSF War

EscalatingCivil war, with substantial interstate dimensions due to extensive foreign military and logistical involvementNorth Africa, with significant overlap into the Horn of Africa; classification varies by institution15 April 2023 – present

A nationwide war between the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) that has produced the world's largest displacement crisis, documented atrocities in Darfur, and a functional partition of the country, with sustained external military support to both sides.

Background

Sudan's 2019 popular uprising ended Omar al-Bashir's three-decade rule. A Transitional Sovereignty Council combining military and civilian leadership, chaired by General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan with Rapid Support Forces (RSF) commander Mohamed Hamdan "Hemedti" Dagalo as his deputy, was charged with overseeing a transition to elections, with Abdalla Hamdok serving as civilian prime minister. In October 2021, Burhan and Hemedti jointly carried out a coup against the civilian-led transition, deposing Hamdok and suspending the constitution.

Under international pressure, the two generals signed a Framework Agreement in December 2022 committing to a two-year transition to civilian rule and, critically, to integrating the RSF into the national armed forces. Disputes over the terms, timeline, and chain of command for that integration became the immediate trigger of the war: fighting erupted in Khartoum on 15 April 2023 and rapidly spread nationwide.

The RSF itself originated in the Janjaweed militias mobilised by the Bashir government to suppress the Darfur rebellion of the 2000s; Hemedti commanded Janjaweed forces implicated in atrocities during that conflict before the RSF was formally established as a state paramilitary force in 2013. This lineage is widely cited by analysts as informative of the RSF's conduct in the current war, particularly in Darfur.

Main Actors

Government
Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF), led by General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan; SAF-aligned government, based in Port Sudan until January 2026 and now in Khartoum
Paramilitary / opposing force
Rapid Support Forces (RSF), led by Mohamed Hamdan "Hemedti" Dagalo; RSF-aligned "Government of Peace and Unity" declared in Nyala, Darfur, in 2025
Allied armed actors
SPLM-North (al-Hilu faction), allied with the RSF in parts of South Kordofan and Blue Nile; Justice and Equality Movement and the Minnawi faction of the Sudan Liberation Movement/Army, aligned against the RSF in Darfur
Foreign governments
United Arab Emirates (principal external backer of the RSF, supplying weapons and financing via Chad, Libya, and reportedly Ethiopia); Egypt (aligned with the SAF); Ethiopia (reported logistical and basing support to the RSF, denied by Addis Ababa)
International mediators / organisations
The "Quad" (United States, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and the UAE); the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD); the African Union; the United Nations

Drivers

  • Political: an unresolved power struggle between the SAF and RSF commands over post-transition military authority.
  • Governance: the failed civilian transition and the unimplemented terms of RSF integration into the national army.
  • Economic: control of Sudan's gold sector and associated trade and smuggling routes.
  • External intervention: sustained foreign military and financial support to both sides, particularly from the UAE to the RSF and Egypt to the SAF.
  • Historical grievances: the legacy of the Darfur conflict and the RSF's Janjaweed origins, including the targeting of non-Arab communities in Darfur.

Timeline

  1. 2019

    Popular uprising ends Omar al-Bashir's rule; Transitional Sovereignty Council formed.

  2. Oct 2021

    Burhan and Hemedti jointly carry out a coup against the civilian-led transition.

  3. Dec 2022

    Framework Agreement on RSF integration into the SAF is signed.

  4. 15 Apr 2023

    War begins in Khartoum between the SAF and RSF.

  5. May 2023

    Jeddah Declaration signed; humanitarian protection provisions are largely unobserved.

  6. Oct–Nov 2023

    Second round of Jeddah talks fails.

  7. Dec 2023

    IGAD hosts a peace summit.

  8. Jan 2024

    Sudan suspends ties with IGAD, ending the bloc's mediation role; Manama backchannel talks collapse after details leak.

  9. Aug 2024

    Famine is declared in Zamzam camp, North Darfur.

  10. Mar 2025

    The SAF recaptures Khartoum.

  11. Jul 2025

    Quad-format talks (US, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, UAE) are cancelled.

  12. Oct 2025

    The RSF captures El Fasher after an eighteen-month siege; the UN Human Rights Office documents over 6,000 killings in the first three days, with the Yale Humanitarian Research Lab's satellite analysis estimating a wider toll of 30,000–60,000.

  13. Jan 2026

    The SAF-aligned government formally returns to Khartoum.

  14. 2026 (ongoing)

    Kordofan becomes the principal active front; drone warfare escalates sharply on both sides, with reporting indicating an approximately 600 percent increase in drone-related deaths between 2024 and 2025.

Humanitarian Impact

Fatality estimates vary substantially depending on methodology and access. Documented and event-based tallies (such as ACLED-recorded fatalities) have ranged from roughly 20,000 to 61,000 over the course of the war, while a former US envoy to Sudan has estimated up to 400,000 deaths when indirect mortality from disease, starvation, and the collapse of healthcare is included; this range is presented here with explicit attribution rather than as a single figure, consistent with this encyclopedia's methodological standards. Displacement stands at approximately 11 to 14 million people, comprising roughly 7 to 8 million internally displaced persons and more than 4 million refugees in Chad, Egypt, South Sudan, and other neighbouring states, constituting the world's largest displacement crisis as of 2026. Famine has been formally confirmed in multiple locations, including Zamzam camp and El Fasher, with tens of millions of people in IPC Phase 3 or worse acute food insecurity. In 2023, the United States government determined that the RSF had committed genocide in Darfur against non-Arab communities, including the Masalit; a 2025 UN fact-finding mission described the RSF's conduct during the fall of El Fasher as bearing the "hallmarks of genocide." Khartoum's hospitals, water systems, and administrative infrastructure sustained catastrophic damage during nearly two years of RSF control of the capital.

Peace Efforts

  • Jeddah Declaration (May 2023) and a second round of Jeddah talks (October–November 2023), mediated by Saudi Arabia and the United States; neither produced a lasting ceasefire.
  • IGAD mediation, including a December 2023 summit, which ended when Sudan suspended its ties with IGAD in January 2024.
  • Manama backchannel talks (January 2024), which collapsed after details of the negotiations were leaked.
  • The Quad framework (United States, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and the UAE), which was cancelled in July 2025 amid disagreement over post-war political arrangements.
  • Sustained UN Security Council engagement, including targeted sanctions on individuals from both the SAF and RSF; no UN peacekeeping mission has been deployed to Sudan itself.

Current Situation

As of mid-2026, Sudan is functionally partitioned between SAF-controlled territory in the east and Khartoum, and RSF-controlled territory across most of Darfur, with Kordofan as the principal active front. Both sides have declared parallel governments. Drone warfare has escalated sharply, and humanitarian funding remains critically short of stated requirements, with international donor attention divided by concurrent crises elsewhere.

Outlook

Neither the SAF nor the RSF currently appears capable of achieving outright military victory, suggesting either a protracted war of attrition or an eventual negotiated de facto partition. The conflict's trajectory depends heavily on whether external backers, particularly the UAE and Egypt, curtail military support, and on whether a renewed and more inclusive mediation framework can overcome the mutual distrust that has defeated previous processes. The risk of further regionalisation, including tension along the Ethiopia–Sudan border and repeated Chadian border closures, remains a significant variable for the wider Horn of Africa.

Explore CRCA

Related CRCA Resources

  • ACRI 2026 Sudan Country Risk Profile (forthcoming)
  • APCO 2026 North Africa / Horn of Africa Regional Chapter
  • CRCA Commentary archive (forthcoming)

Further Reading

  • Amnesty International. (2026). Destruction and violence in Sudan. amnesty.org
  • Arab Center Washington DC. (2025). Sudan's war: The failure of mediation and the struggle for civilian rule. arabcenterdc.org
  • Center for Strategic and International Studies. (2026). The Sudan war in 10 charts. csis.org
  • Council on Foreign Relations. (2026). Civil war in Sudan. Global Conflict Tracker. cfr.org
  • House of Lords Library. (2024). Civil war in Sudan: Is there a path to peace? UK Parliament. lordslibrary.parliament.uk
  • Human Rights Watch. (2026). World report 2026: Sudan. hrw.org
  • International Crisis Group. (2025). Bolstering efforts to end Sudan''s civil war. crisisgroup.org
  • International Rescue Committee. (2026). Crisis in Sudan: What is happening and how to help. rescue.org

Citation

Conflict Research, Consulting & Advocacy (CRCA). (2026). Sudan Civil War (2023–present). In CRCA African Conflict Encyclopedia (2026 ed.). Conflict Research, Consulting & Advocacy. Retrieved from https://crcahub.org

Editorial Metadata

Version
1.0 (Pilot)
Editor
CRCA–ACAN Editorial Team
Status
Pilot entry — full peer review pending
Sources updated
21 June 2026
Next review
September 2026
All entries