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📄 APA-0005 Superseded

Doha Document for Peace in Darfur (DDPD)

Also known as: DDPD

Country
Sudan
Region
East Africa
Date signed
14 July 2011
Type
Comprehensive Peace Agreement
Mediator(s)
State of Qatar, AU–UN Joint Mediation (JMST)

A framework settlement for Darfur covering power sharing, compensation, justice and a Darfur Regional Authority; weakened from the outset by the non-signature of the major rebel movements and later folded into the Juba process.

Conflict Background

After the failed 2006 Abuja Darfur Peace Agreement, mediation moved to Doha. The strongest movements — SLM/A-Abdul Wahid, SLM/A-Minni Minnawi and mainstream JEM — declined to sign, leaving a coalition of smaller factions as the principal counterpart.

Negotiation Context

The DDPD attempted to settle a war whose drivers — land tenure, pastoralist–farmer competition, militia impunity and centre–periphery marginalisation — extended well beyond the signatories' control.

Parties

  • Government of Sudan
  • Liberation and Justice Movement (LJM)
  • JEM–Sudan (acceded 2013)

Mediators & Guarantors

Mediators
  • · State of Qatar
  • · AU–UN Joint Mediation (JMST)
Guarantors
  • · Qatar
  • · African Union
  • · United Nations

Key Provisions

Darfur Regional Authority and a referendum on Darfur's administrative status
Compensation fund for war victims and returnees
Justice mechanisms including a Special Court for Darfur
Power-sharing quotas for Darfuris in national institutions
Ceasefire and final security arrangements

Implementation

Superseded in substance by the Juba Peace Agreement (2020); Darfur has since become a principal theatre of the post-2023 Sudan war, including the fall of El Fasher in late 2025.

Timeline

  1. 2011-07-14
    Signed in Doha
  2. 2013-04-06
    JEM–Sudan faction accedes
  3. 2016-04
    Darfur administrative status referendum held amid opposition boycott
  4. 2020-10-03
    Darfur track effectively folded into the Juba Peace Agreement

Challenges

  • Non-signature of the militarily significant movements
  • Compensation and returns chronically underfunded
  • Janjaweed/RSF trajectory outside the agreement's security framework

Outcomes

  • Kept a negotiation architecture and Darfuri political representation alive between Abuja (2006) and Juba (2020)
  • Established compensation and land-commission concepts later carried into the JPA

Lessons

  • Signatory representativeness outweighs textual comprehensiveness
  • Compensation promises without financing corrode public trust in peace processes
  • Leaving irregular forces outside security arrangements stores up catastrophic risk

Related CRCA Resources

References

  • Government of Sudan & LJM (2011). Doha Document for Peace in Darfur.
  • Flint, J. & de Waal, A. (2008). Darfur: A New History of a Long War.