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West Africa / Sahel / Lake Chad Basin·Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger, Nigeria, Cameroon, Chad

West Africa Sahel and Lake Chad Basin — Conflict Cluster Overview

Also known as: Sahel conflict cluster; Lake Chad Basin cluster; AES region overview

ActiveConflict Cluster Overview — jihadist insurgencies, military coups, political crises, and civilian displacementWest Africa / Sahel / Lake Chad BasinEarly 2000s – present

Navigational cluster overview connecting six entries — Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger, JNIM, Boko Haram, and ISWAP — across the most rapidly deteriorating security environment in sub-Saharan Africa, where AES juntas, two rival jihadist franchises, and structurally marginalised Sahelian communities are reshaping West Africa.

Background

The West Africa Sahel and Lake Chad Basin conflict cluster encompasses the most rapidly deteriorating security environment in sub-Saharan Africa. Across the six conflict entries in this cluster — three country-level conflicts (Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger) and three armed-group entries (JNIM, Boko Haram, ISWAP) — there runs a single structural thread: the convergence of weak post-colonial states, economic marginalisation of Sahelian communities, predatory governance, and two competing jihadist franchises (al-Qaeda through JNIM, and the Islamic State through ISWAP and its Sahel Province) that have exploited these structural conditions to build parallel governance systems across vast territories.

The scale of the crisis as of mid-2026 is staggering. JNIM and the Islamic State Sahel Province (ISSP, previously ISGS) together control an estimated 60% of Burkina Faso's territory and significant portions of Mali and Niger. The April 2026 JNIM-Azawad Liberation Front (FLA) coordinated offensive across Mali — killing Mali's defence minister, besieging multiple cities simultaneously, and forcing Africa Corps to withdraw from Kidal — represents the Sahel's most significant jihadist military breakthrough since the 2012 crisis. Meanwhile, the Lake Chad Basin faces its own parallel emergency: ISWAP ranked as the Islamic State's most active 'province' globally in 2025, and the US-Nigeria joint operation launched in May 2026 marks the first major direct US military engagement in West Africa in years.

The cluster's political architecture has transformed fundamentally since 2020. Mali's coup in August 2020 (and the second coup in May 2021), Burkina Faso's two coups in 2022, and Niger's coup in July 2023 created a bloc of anti-Western military governments that expelled French and UN forces, replaced Western security partnerships with Russian Africa Corps, and withdrew from ECOWAS in January 2025 — one of the most dramatic regional geopolitical realignments in West Africa's post-independence history. The premise justifying these coups was that Western-led counterterrorism had failed; the evidence of 2024–2026 suggests that the Russian-backed alternative has failed more catastrophically.

Main Actors

Alliance of Sahel States (AES)
Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger juntas; formalised September 2023; withdrew from ECOWAS January 2025.
JNIM (al-Qaeda affiliate)
Jama'at Nasr al-Islam wal Muslimin; formed March 2017 by merger of AQIM Sahara branch, Ansar Dine, Macina Liberation Front, and Al Mourabitoun under Iyad Ag Ghaly.
ISSP / ISWAP (Islamic State affiliates)
Islamic State Sahel Province (formerly ISGS) across Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger; ISWAP across the Lake Chad Basin — IS's top global province in 2025.
Boko Haram (JAS)
Surviving faction under Bakura Doro; resurgent in Borno and Cameroon's Far North.
Russian Africa Corps
Successor to Wagner; principal external security partner of the AES juntas.
United States
Re-engaging directly in the Lake Chad Basin from December 2025 (Sokoto airstrikes) and the May 2026 joint operation with Nigeria.
ECOWAS
Sidelined by AES withdrawal; threatened but did not intervene after Niger's July 2023 coup.

Drivers

  • Weak post-colonial states and predatory governance
  • Economic marginalisation of Sahelian, pastoral, and rural communities
  • Competing al-Qaeda (JNIM) and Islamic State (ISSP/ISWAP) franchises
  • Anti-Western realignment and the AES bloc
  • MNJTF degradation and ECOWAS sidelining

Timeline

  1. 2002–2009

    Mohammed Yusuf founds Boko Haram in Maiduguri (early 2000s); 2009 Maiduguri uprising; Yusuf killed; Shekau takes over.

  2. 2012

    First Tuareg/MNLA rebellion in northern Mali (January); military coup in Bamako (March); MNLA, Ansar Dine, and AQIM seize northern Mali.

  3. 2013

    French Operation Serval recaptures northern Malian cities; MINUSMA deployed; Algiers peace process begins.

  4. 2014

    Boko Haram peak: declares 'caliphate' (August); Chibok kidnapping (April); MNJTF activated.

  5. March 2015

    Boko Haram pledges allegiance to IS; renamed ISWAP. Nigeria-led coalition drives Boko Haram from most territory.

  6. August 2015

    First significant ISGS attacks in Burkina Faso's northern Sahel region.

  7. March 2017

    JNIM formed: merger of AQIM Sahara branch, Ansar Dine, Macina Liberation Front, and Al Mourabitoun under Iyad Ag Ghaly.

  8. August 2020 – May 2021

    Two coups in Mali bring Colonel Assimi Goita to power.

  9. May–June 2021

    ISWAP overruns Sambisa Forest; Shekau killed. ISWAP absorbs much of JAS.

  10. January–September 2022

    Two coups in Burkina Faso (Damiba in January; Traoré in September). France expelled; Africa Corps invited.

  11. July 2023

    Military coup in Niger: General Tchiani deposes President Bazoum.

  12. September 2023

    Alliance of Sahel States (AES) formed; MINUSMA terminated; Operation Barkhane formally concluded.

  13. November 2023

    Mali/Wagner forces recapture Kidal from MNLA/FLA.

  14. January 2025

    Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger formally withdraw from ECOWAS.

  15. March 2025

    ISWAP launches major renewed offensive in Borno State; Niger withdraws from MNJTF.

  16. September 2025

    JNIM imposes fuel blockade on Bamako supply routes; Tillaberi (Niger) becomes deadliest Sahel region in ACLED data; Burkina Faso announces ICC withdrawal.

  17. 25–26 April 2026

    JNIM-FLA coordinated nationwide attacks across Mali; Defence Minister Sadio Camara killed; Africa Corps forced to withdraw from Kidal.

  18. May 2026

    US-Nigeria joint operations against ISWAP; senior leader al-Minuki killed (16 May); 175 militants killed by 19 May. JNIM expands into coastal states including Benin.

Humanitarian Impact

The cluster includes some of the world's largest displacement crises. The Lake Chad Basin alone hosts ~2.9 million IDPs (2.3 million in Nigeria) per OCHA (June 2025). Central Sahel displacement totals are in the multi-millions across Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger. The 2025 Lake Chad Basin humanitarian response was funded at only 19% of requirements. JNIM's September 2025 fuel blockade on Bamako, the February 2026 ISSP attack on Niamey airport, and the April 2026 JNIM-FLA offensive across Mali underline a worsening trajectory for civilians.

Peace Efforts

  • Algiers Process (2013–): peace track with northern Malian armed groups; effectively collapsed under junta rule.
  • MINUSMA (2013–2023): UN peacekeeping mission to Mali; withdrew at Mali's request in December 2023.
  • Operation Serval / Barkhane (2013–2022): French-led counterterrorism operations; formally concluded after AES expulsions.
  • MNJTF (2014–present): Lake Chad Basin multinational force; severely degraded by Niger's March 2025 withdrawal.

Current Situation

The three Sahel juntas collectively govern states losing territory at an accelerating rate. JNIM has progressively moved toward a governance and political-legitimacy model (akin to HTS in Syria), while ISSP/ISWAP tends toward more indiscriminate military targeting. In the Lake Chad Basin, ISWAP's 'Holocaust of the Camps' offensive and the May 2026 US-Nigeria joint operation killing senior leader al-Minuki define the current operating tempo. The cluster's geopolitical centre has shifted: French and UN forces are gone; ECOWAS engagement structures have been dismantled; Russian Africa Corps, China, and Turkey are filling the security and economic vacuum.

Outlook

The cluster's trajectory is shaped by three structural dynamics: (1) the AES realignment and its security failure — the anti-Western counterterrorism bet has not delivered on its stated terms; (2) the JNIM-ISSP rivalry — competing organisational logics rather than a unified 'jihadist threat'; and (3) the colonial and post-colonial political economy of marginalisation of Sahelian, pastoral, and rural communities. No military solution can address this structural foundation; durable de-escalation requires governance investment alongside any counterterrorism strategy.

Explore CRCA

Related CRCA Resources

  • APCO 2026 — West Africa and Sahel Sub-Regional Conflict Trends Analysis

Further Reading

  • International Crisis Group (2026). West Africa / Sahel cluster — country and armed-group reports. crisisgroup.org
  • Journal of Democracy (2026, May). Why Mali is at a dangerous crossroads. journalofdemocracy.org
  • Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect (2026). Central Sahel (Burkina Faso, Mali, Niger). globalr2p.org
  • ACLED (2026). Sahel and Lake Chad Basin data and analysis. acleddata.com
  • Chatham House (2026, April 30). Mali attacks show security cannot be delivered by military means alone. chathamhouse.org
  • Security Council Report (2025, December). West Africa and the Sahel Monthly Forecast. securitycouncilreport.org
  • Pham, J. P. (2019). The corrupting effects of counterterrorism aid: The case of the Sahel. Parameters, 49(1–2).
  • Thurston, A. (2018). Salafi reforms, radical politics: Islam and the jihadist threat in Senegal and Niger. African Affairs, 117(469).

Citation

This Overview Page is a navigational document. For citation purposes, factual claims should be cited from individual conflict entries.

Editorial Metadata

Version
1.0 (Pilot)
Editor
CRCA–ACAN Editorial Team
Status
Pilot entry — full peer review pending
Sources updated
24 June 2026
Next review
December 2026
All entries