West Africa Residual Conflicts — Cluster Overview

Introduction

This cluster brings together four analytically distinct but thematically connected entries from West and Central Africa that complete the sub-regional coverage begun in Batches 4 and 5. The entries are not a single conflict cluster but rather a set of country-level analyses that each illuminate a different dimension of West Africa’s political and security landscape: Nigeria’s expanding northwest insecurity belt (a criminal-insurgent convergence with jihadist dimensions now confirmed by multiple intelligence assessments); Côte d’Ivoire’s democratic consolidation failure (a competitive authoritarian system that has survived three decades without a peaceful transfer of power between different political parties); Chad’s dynastic authoritarian succession (the son of a 30-year autocrat who had his father killed at the front against rebels, subsequently removing constitutional constraints on indefinite rule); and Senegal’s democratic transition (sub-Saharan Africa’s most significant peaceful transfer of power in 2024, now entering a turbulent governing phase following the Faye-Sonko split of May 2026).

The cluster’s analytical significance lies in the diversity of trajectories it documents. West Africa is not a single political story — it is a region of simultaneously deteriorating security environments (northwest Nigeria, Chad’s neighbourhood), competitive authoritarian consolidations (Côte d’Ivoire, Chad), and genuine democratic moments (Senegal 2024). Reading these trajectories together is essential for accurate sub-regional assessment.

Key Analytical Themes

The jihadist-criminal convergence in northwest Nigeria

Northwest Nigeria’s banditry crisis is entering a qualitatively new phase. What began as cattle rustling and rural criminality is now documented as converging with jihadist networks (Ansaru/JNIM, ISWAP, Lakurawa) in ways that are transforming the character of violence. The survival of Bello Turji’s network after US Tomahawk missile strikes in December 2025 — followed by rearmament and expanded operations — illustrates both the embedded resilience of these networks and the limits of military solutions without political accompaniment.

West African democratic regression

Côte d’Ivoire’s October 2025 presidential election — in which Ouattara won a fourth term after the systematic exclusion of all major opposition candidates — and Chad’s October 2025 constitutional amendment removing term limits illustrate the continuing regression of democratic institutions across West and Central Africa. Neither country has experienced a peaceful inter-party transfer of power since independence. Both contrast sharply with Senegal’s 2024 transition.

Senegal as a democratic counter-narrative

Senegal’s March 2024 election — in which Bassirou Diomaye Faye won the presidency as an opposition candidate who had been released from prison ten days before the vote — represents sub-Saharan Africa’s most significant democratic moment in 2024. The subsequent Faye-Sonko governing tensions and the May 2026 split between the two architects of the PASTEF revolution illustrate the structural difficulties of translating opposition momentum into governance capacity, while preserving the essential democratic achievement of the transfer itself.

This Overview Page is a navigational document. Factual claims should be cited from individual entries.

Cluster Entry Index

• OVP — West Africa Residual Conflicts — Cluster Overview Page (this document)
• #71 — Nigeria — Northwest Banditry, Kidnapping, and the Expanding Insecurity Belt
• #72 — Côte d’Ivoire — Electoral Violence, Democratic Capture, and the Ouattara–Gbagbo Endgame
• #73 — Chad — Dynastic Succession, Regional Security Anchor, and the Deby Family State
• #74 — Senegal — The 2024 Democratic Transition and the Faye–Sonko Government