West Africa·Nigeria (Middle Belt / North-Central)

Nigeria Farmer-Herder Conflict: Land, Ethnicity, and Violence in the Middle Belt (Ongoing)

Also known as: Farmer-pastoralist conflict; Middle Belt conflict; Fulani-farmer clashes; Benue-Plateau violence; Middle Belt crisis

EscalatingCommunal Violence; Resource Conflict; Armed Violence; Ethnoreligious ConflictWest Africa

Background

Nigeria’s farmer-herder conflict is one of Africa’s most lethal and least-understood conflicts — a crisis that has killed more people in some years than Boko Haram in the northeast, yet receives a fraction of the international attention, partly because it is consistently misframed by the Nigerian government as a resource dispute between pastoralists and farmers rather than acknowledged as what community leaders, human rights researchers, and the pattern of violence itself describe as organised armed assault on fixed civilian communities.

The conflict’s structural drivers are genuine and long-standing. Nigeria’s predominantly Muslim Fulani pastoralists have moved their cattle along seasonal transhumance routes across the country for generations, spending wet seasons in the north and dry seasons further south. But from the 1980s onward, these routes have been progressively blocked by expanding agricultural settlement, climate change pushing the Sahara southward, the shrinking of Lake Chad eliminating major northern grazing areas, and the proliferation of illegal weapons that transformed all actor categories in the conflict. Competition over land and water between Fulani herders and farming communities — predominantly Christian or animist in the Middle Belt — has always existed; it turned systematically lethal from approximately 2014–2016.

The critical analytical shift, documented by multiple researchers but consistently resisted by the Nigerian federal government, is that what began as a resource conflict has transformed in significant part into organised armed violence by what are variously described as ‘armed herdsmen,’ militia groups, and increasingly by some analysts as jihadist-adjacent networks. The pattern of attacks — nocturnal coordinated multi-entry assaults on fixed communities, heavy automatic weapons, deliberate burning of homes with residents inside, systematic targeting of the same communities across seasons, and the near-total absence of accountability or prosecution for the perpetrators — is inconsistent with spontaneous communal clashes and consistent with organised military-style operations. Multiple reports have identified fighters from Chad, Niger, Burkina Faso, Mali, and Cameroon operating in Middle Belt attacks, suggesting transnational armed networks using the herder-farmer frame as cover.

The Yelwata massacre of 13 June 2025 in Guma Local Government Area, Benue State, is the single most devastating recent event. An estimated 100 to 200 people were killed (official: 100+; eyewitnesses: up to 200) when gunmen arrived at approximately 10 PM and remained for up to five hours, systematically entering homes and burning families alive. Most of the dead were women and children. The massacre was condemned by Pope Francis, who described it as a ‘terrible massacre.’ President Tinubu framed it as a ‘herder-farmer clash’ — a characterisation immediately and angrily rejected by the Tor Tiv, Professor James Ortese Iorzua Ayatse (chairman of the Benue State Traditional Rulers Council), who described it as ‘a full-scale genocidal invasion and land-grabbing campaign.’

The analytical framing question carries enormous practical consequences. If the attacks are a resource conflict, the solution is grazing reserve allocation, open grazing law reform, and state-level mediation. If they are organised militia violence with potential jihadist dimensions, the solution requires a fundamentally different response: federal military operations, prosecution of perpetrators and their political patrons, and intelligence-led interdiction of cross-border armed networks. Nigeria’s consistent adoption of the resource conflict frame has resulted in the latter response never being systematically attempted.

Key Statistics And Patterns

Benue State deaths (2004–2025) — Over 6,800 (Amnesty International)
Middle Belt IDP (Benue) — 500,000+ (IOM 2024); nearly all from 3,790 residents of Ichwa IDP camp are Benue attack survivors (UNHCR)
2016 deaths (Benue + Kaduna) — Over 2,000 (Assessment Capacity Project)
2016 share of national fatalities — Herder attacks = 44% of all fatalities in Nigeria that year (SBM Intel)
April 2025 — At least 56 killed over Easter weekend, Logo and Ukum LGA, Benue State
May 2025 — 45+ killed across Benue State attacks
June 13, 2025 (Yelwata) — 100–200 killed; attackers remained 5 hours; families burned alive
June 14, 2025 (Gum) — At least 100 killed; many burned alive; hundreds injured; dozens missing
June 2025 (Apa + Gwer West) — ~58 killed in separate attacks
30 March 2026 (Jos North) — At least 20 killed by motorcycle-mounted gunmen
Kaduna (week of June 2026) — 13 killed, 10 wounded, 28 abducted in midnight raid on Kahir village

Main Actors

Fulani armed groups / militia: The primary perpetrators of most documented large-scale attacks in the Middle Belt. Distinct from legitimate Fulani pastoralists who also face cattle rustling and land access restrictions. Increasingly well-armed with AK-47s and other automatic weapons. Multiple reports document fighters from Sahel countries operating within or alongside these groups. The Miyetti Allah Cattle Breeders Association (MACBAN) consistently distances itself from armed attackers.
Farming communities and self-defence groups: The primary victims in most major incidents. Farming communities across Benue, Plateau, and Kaduna states have formed local self-defence groups in response to sustained attacks. Some self-defence operations have produced retaliatory killings of Fulani herders and communities, creating a cycle of violence. Cattle rustling by some local youths has also occurred.
Nigerian Federal Government and Security Forces: Has consistently framed the conflict as resource-based and deployed both kinetic (Operation Whirl Stroke, 2018) and non-kinetic (failed RUGA cattle settlement programme, 2019) responses that have not reduced violence. Military deployments have generally arrived after attacks, not prevented them. Reports of security forces’ complicity or inaction are widespread and persistent.
Bandits and criminal networks: The conflict increasingly overlaps with the Northwest banditry crisis (Zamfara, Katsina, Kaduna, Niger, Sokoto states) in which criminal gangs conduct mass kidnappings for ransom. Some Middle Belt attacks may involve criminal rather than herder-farmer motivations. A February 2026 Reuters investigation found groups linked to al-Qaeda and the Islamic State operating in northwest Nigeria with heightened lethality in 2025.
Transnational armed actors (alleged): Multiple sources including community leaders, state governors, and the UN-linked Academic Association of Political Science Studies identify fighters from Chad, Niger, Mali, Burkina Faso, and Cameroon operating in Middle Belt attacks. This alleged transnational dimension, if confirmed at scale, would fundamentally change the conflict’s classification from communal to organised armed conflict with potential jihadist dimensions.

Drivers

Climate change and land pressure: Advancing desertification is pushing Fulani herders southward as northern grazing land degrades. Lake Chad’s shrinkage has eliminated major traditional grazing areas. Southern farmers have progressively converted traditional grazing corridors to farmland as agricultural populations expand. These pressures create genuine resource scarcity that provides the conflict’s structural foundation.
Weapons proliferation: The proliferation of automatic weapons — from Libya’s post-2011 collapse, from Sahel conflict zones, and through domestic criminal networks — has transformed what were historically land and cattle disputes (typically resolved through traditional conflict resolution mechanisms) into mass-casualty armed operations. The availability of AK-47s and other military-grade weapons is a critical enabling condition for the scale of current violence.
Governance failure and impunity: The near-total absence of prosecution of perpetrators of documented large-scale attacks is the most reliable driver of continuing violence. When armed groups can kill hundreds of civilians, burn dozens of homes, and face zero legal consequences, they have been structurally incentivised to repeat and escalate. The Nigerian justice system has failed catastrophically to establish accountability for Middle Belt atrocities.
Ethnoreligious polarisation: The conflict’s ethnic and religious dimensions — Fulani Muslim attackers targeting predominantly Christian communities in the Middle Belt — have been amplified by social media, diaspora advocacy, and political manipulation. While not all attacks are religiously motivated, the religious framing has international resonance and has drawn US attention (President Trump’s 2025 comments on Christians killed in Nigeria) that may be shaping US foreign policy pressure on Abuja.
Federal government framing paralysis: The persistent government refusal to acknowledge the conflict’s organised dimensions — whether for political reasons (Fulani constitute a significant political constituency), ethnic solidarity, or genuine analytical disagreement — prevents deployment of the counterinsurgency response that organised armed groups require. The ‘herder-farmer’ frame produces dialogue and grazing reserve allocations; the ‘organised militia’ frame produces military operations and prosecutions. The choice of frame determines the response.

Timeline

Pre-2014
Seasonal herder-farmer clashes occur regularly across the Middle Belt. Resolved through traditional mechanisms (cattle compensation, community dialogue). Periodic flare-ups of violence, but not at mass-casualty scale.
2014–2016
Dramatic escalation. Benue State attacks kill thousands. Kaduna clashes escalate. 2016: herder attacks account for 44% of all Nigerian fatalities (SBM Intel). Automatic weapons now systematically deployed.
January 2018
Benue State massacre: hundreds killed in Guma and Logo LGAs on New Year’s Day. Benue governor blames Fulani herdsmen. Federal government’s response described as inadequate. Military deployed retrospectively.
2018–2019
Operation Whirl Stroke: military deployment to Benue, Taraba, Nasarawa. Limited effectiveness. RUGA (Rural Grazing Area) programme proposed — rejected by most states as land seizure. National Livestock Transformation Plan announced.
2019–2024
Conflict continues with regular mass-casualty attacks across Benue, Plateau, Kaduna. Governor Zulum’s Borno State community-based approach partially effective. Middle Belt attacks largely ignored internationally.
April 2025
At least 56 killed over Easter weekend in Logo/Ukum LGA, Benue State. Multiple separate attacks.
May 2025
45+ killed across Benue communities.
13 June 2025
Yelwata massacre, Guma LGA, Benue: 100–200 killed by gunmen who spent 5 hours systematically attacking homes and burning families alive. Pope Francis condemns attack as a ‘terrible massacre.’ President Tinubu’s ‘herder-farmer clash’ framing angrily rejected by the Tor Tiv.
14 June 2025
Gum, Benue: 100+ killed, many burned alive.
Mid-June 2025
Apa and Gwer West LGAs, Benue: approximately 58 killed in separate attacks. June becomes the deadliest month in Benue in recent years.
August 2025
LSE Africa at LSE analysis documents that attacks follow ‘a chillingly similar script — night raids, mass killings, razed villages, and mass displacement.’
30 March 2026
Jos North, Plateau State: at least 20 killed by motorcycle-mounted gunmen.
Week of June 2026
Kahir village, Southern Kaduna: 13 killed, 10 wounded, 28 abducted in midnight raid.

Humanitarian Impact

The Middle Belt conflict’s humanitarian toll is difficult to fully quantify because the Nigerian government’s framing discourages systematic documentation, and attacks in rural Benue, Plateau, and Kaduna communities are often not reported in international media. Amnesty International’s count of over 6,800 killed in Benue State alone since 2004 is almost certainly an undercount. The 500,000+ IDPs in Benue State are among the most neglected displaced populations in Africa: isolated in IDP camps with inadequate food, medical care, or security, with no prospect of safe return to communities that continue to be attacked.

The conflict’s economic impact extends beyond the immediate deaths and displacement. Farmers who cannot safely cultivate their land reduce food production in a region that feeds much of Nigeria’s south. IDP camp populations are economically inactive. Communities that experienced repeated attacks have lost the social and physical infrastructure — schools, churches, communal granaries, market infrastructure — that would enable recovery even if security were restored.

Peace Efforts

Operation Whirl Stroke (2018–present): Federal military operation deployed to Benue, Nasarawa, and Taraba. Assessed by most analysts as largely ineffective in preventing attacks; forces typically arrive after the violence. Operation continues but has not reduced attack frequency or lethality.
RUGA / National Livestock Transformation Plan: The federal government’s primary policy response — creating designated grazing settlements and modernising pastoralism — was deeply unpopular with farming states who saw it as legitimising Fulani land appropriation. Most southern and Middle Belt states rejected it; implementation has been minimal.
State-level open grazing bans: Several Middle Belt states (Benue, Taraba, Ekiti, Plateau) have enacted laws banning open grazing. These laws exist in significant tension with federal pastoralist policy. Enforcement is inconsistent. The Miyetti Allah Cattle Breeders Association has challenged the laws.
Traditional conflict resolution: Community-level dialogue between farmer and herder leaders has worked in some localities, particularly where local government provides facilitation. But the scale and organisation of larger attacks has surpassed what traditional resolution mechanisms can manage.

Current Situation

As of mid-2026, the Middle Belt conflict is at or near its highest intensity in years. The June 2025 massacres — in which over 300 people were killed across three major incidents in a single month in Benue State — represent an escalation that shocked communities but produced no breakthrough in federal policy. The March 2026 Jos North attack confirms that Plateau State remains an active conflict zone. The hybridisation of violence — the overlap of herder-farmer conflict with organised banditry, criminal networks, and increasingly jihadist-adjacent groups — is deepening the security challenge and further undermining the effectiveness of dialogue-only approaches.

The international dimensions of this conflict deserve closer monitoring by CRCA and ACAN. If transnational armed networks from Sahel conflict zones are systematically operating in the Nigerian Middle Belt, this represents a potentially significant southward extension of the jihadist insurgency that has already consumed Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger. Nigeria’s federal government’s consistent refusal to investigate this dimension means it is not being adequately monitored or countered.

Explore CRCA

Related CRCA Resources

APCO 2026 — Sub-Regional Conflict Trends Analysis
ACRI 2026 — Country Risk Score: Nigeria Farmer-Herder Conflict

Citation

CRCA–ACAN Editorial Team (2026). Nigeria Farmer-Herder Conflict: Land, Ethnicity, and Violence in the Middle Belt. In CRCA African Conflict Encyclopedia, Volume I. Conflict Research, Consulting & Advocacy (CRCA) / African Conflict Analyst Network (ACAN). https://crcahub.org/encyclopedia/nigeria-farmer-herder

Editorial Metadata

Version: 1.0 (Pilot)
Editor: CRCA–ACAN Editorial Team
Status: Pilot entry — full peer review pending
Sources updated: 28 August 2026
Next review: December 2026

All entries

Future premium features

· Advanced search & filters
· AI-generated explanations
· Comparative conflict analysis
· PDF & citation exports
· Saved reading lists