East Africa and Horn of Africa — Conflict Cluster Overview

The East Africa and Horn of Africa conflict cluster encompasses four active or recently resolved conflicts that share a set of structural features: the intersection of state fragility, ethno-federal political crises, jihadist insurgency, and insufficient international peacekeeping capacity. Three of the four entries involve armed groups affiliated with the Islamic State or al-Qaeda; three involve states that have simultaneously faced multiple internal armed conflicts; and all four are characterised by large-scale civilian displacement, severe humanitarian crises, and partial or failing peace processes. Ethiopia - with a population of approximately 135 million, Africa's second most populous country - anchors the cluster. Its Tigray War (2020-2022) was, by conservative estimates, the deadliest conflict of the 2020s globally, killing between 383,000 and 600,000 people in two years. Its aftermath has produced a partially implemented peace agreement, renewed political tensions between the federal government, Tigray, and Eritrea, and simultaneous insurgencies in the Amhara and Oromia regions that continue to kill civilians and displace millions as of mid-2026. The June 2026 national elections - disrupted by security conditions in Tigray, Amhara, and Oromia - represent the latest flashpoint in Abiy Ahmed's increasingly contested hold on power. Somalia presents the Horn's longest-running governance crisis: a state that has been functionally collapsed since 1991 and that has never re-established effective sovereignty across its territory. Al-Shabaab - al-Qaeda's most financially autonomous African affiliate - controls large rural areas of southern and central Somalia and has demonstrated the ability to strike at the heart of Mogadishu's government. The transition from ATMIS to AUSSOM in January 2025 has created new security gaps that al-Shabaab has systematically exploited. Political crisis at the federal level - including President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud's constitutional manoeuvres ahead of his May 2026 term expiry - compounds the security deterioration. Mozambique's Cabo Delgado insurgency completes the cluster: a nearly decade-long Islamic State affiliate conflict in southern Africa that remains one of the world's most underreported crises. Rwanda's military deployment in Mozambique - which has doubled in size since SAMIM's 2024 withdrawal - has established Rwanda as the most significant external security actor in Cabo Delgado, reflecting a broader Rwandan power-projection strategy that simultaneously operates in the DRC and Mozambique.

Jihadist insurgencies and weak state governance Three of the four entries involve IS or AQ-affiliated jihadist groups (al-Shabaab is an AQ affiliate; ISM/ISCAP Mozambique is an IS affiliate; ISCAP DRC is covered in the DRC cluster). The common structural driver across all three is the same pattern that recurs in the Sahel: jihadist organisations embedding themselves in communities where the state has provided no governance, security, or economic opportunity. Al-Shabaab's 25-year survival reflects its sophisticated governance model in southern Somalia; ISM Mozambique has exploited Muslim minority marginalisation in Cabo Delgado since 2017. Counterterrorism that addresses only the military dimension without the governance deficit is insufficient - a lesson demonstrated by twenty years of AMISOM/ATMIS operations in Somalia with no resolution. Ethiopia's ethno-federal crisis and regional stability Ethiopia's multiple simultaneous conflicts - Tigray, Amhara, Oromia, and renewed Tigray-Eritrea tensions - represent the most complex multi-front conflict management challenge in Africa. The Pretoria Agreement's incomplete implementation and the January 2026 Tigray clashes demonstrate that the peace process remains fragile. An Ethiopian state failure or renewed Tigray war would have cascading effects across the Horn: Ethiopian troops are a critical AUSSOM troop contributor; Ethiopia's stability is essential for regional economic corridors; and Ethiopia-Eritrea war would dramatically reshape Great Lakes and Nile Basin dynamics. Rwanda's dual power projection in DRC and Mozambique Rwanda's simultaneous military deployments in the DRC (backing M23/RDF) and Mozambique (backing FADM against ISM) represent one of the most remarkable small-state power-projection strategies in Africa. In the DRC, Rwanda is widely seen as an aggressor; in Mozambique, it is universally seen as a stabilising force. This dual posture has allowed Rwanda to partially offset the reputational damage of its DRC operations with the soft-power gains of its Mozambique counterterrorism role. The connection between these two deployments as elements of Rwanda's broader regional strategy deserves analytical attention.