Ethiopia Amhara and Oromia Conflicts

Ethiopia's post-Tigray War political landscape is one of simultaneous insurgencies. While the Pretoria Agreement of November 2022 ended the Tigray War's active phase, it left a set of political contradictions that are now producing their own armed conflicts: the Amhara Fano insurgency, which grew directly from the Tigray War's aftermath, and the intensified Oromo Liberation Army (OLA) conflict in Oromia, which has continued since well before the Tigray War and shows no sign of resolution despite a December 2024 peace deal with one OLA faction. The Fano insurgency has its specific origin in April 2023, when Abiy Ahmed's government announced plans to dissolve Amhara's regional special forces (Agazi) and integrate them into the Ethiopian National Defense Forces (ENDF) or federal police. This decision was experienced by Amhara communities as a fundamental betrayal: Amhara fighters had served as essential federal allies during the Tigray War, suffering significant casualties and seizing Western Tigray territories they viewed as historically theirs. Now, with the TPLF de-listed from terrorism designations and a peace deal signed that was perceived as rewarding Tigrayan aggression, the government was disarming the Amhara militia that had secured those gains. Fano forces, which had begun as community self-defence groups during the 2016-2018 Amhara protests against TPLF rule, refused to disarm and became an insurgent movement. The escalation was rapid. By August 2023, the ENDF declared a state of emergency across Amhara Region after Fano forces captured Gondar, Lalibela, Dessie, and other major cities. The state of emergency imposed a curfew and banned public gatherings. Despite the emergency powers, fighting has continued across Amhara's 11 zones, with ACLED documenting battle events in 31 or more districts as of 2025-2026. The government has deployed drones and airstrikes against Fano positions, producing civilian casualties. Orthodox clergy have supported Fano in many communities; monasteries have served as meeting locations. Fano is suspected of receiving support from the TPLF and Eritrea - creating an alignment between Amhara nationalists and the Tigrayans they fought against in the Tigray War, united by shared opposition to Abiy's government. The Oromia conflict has different origins. The Oromo Liberation Army (OLA, also known as Shane) broke away from the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF) in 2018 after the OLF reached a peace deal with Abiy's government. The OLA, refusing to disarm, continued fighting for Oromo autonomy or independence from Ethiopian federal rule. The OLA briefly allied with the TPLF in 2021 during the TDF counteroffensive toward Addis Ababa, demonstrating its willingness to collaborate with tactical allies against a common government adversary. In December 2024, the federal government signed a peace deal with one OLA faction, but fighting continued under other OLA commanders. Government forces continue to conduct drone strikes and extrajudicial executions of perceived OLA supporters in Oromia; the ENDF and OLA both commit atrocities against civilians, including ethnic Amharas targeted by OLA in border areas. The June 2026 national elections - the first nationwide poll since the formal end of the Tigray War - demonstrated the depth of the governance crisis. The Fano National Movement announced transport restrictions across Amhara Region for the election period. The OLA declared a 'total ban' on movement across Oromia. Voting was suspended in Tigray Region due to the TPLF's unresolved political status. 143 polling stations were closed in Oromia and Amhara. Abiy's Prosperity Party won a strong majority in the areas where voting was held, but the elections' legitimacy is contested by opposition groups across Ethiopia.

The Amhara and Oromia conflicts have displaced hundreds of thousands and killed thousands of civilians since 2021. The Global R2P Centre estimated over 3.3 million people remain displaced across Ethiopia. UN human rights monitors have documented widespread reports of extrajudicial killings, arbitrary detentions, forced displacement, destruction of property, attacks on healthcare, looting, and sexual violence in Amhara. Oromia has faced similar patterns, with the OLA targeting ethnic Amhara communities in border areas and government forces conducting drone strikes and extrajudicial killings of perceived OLA supporters. The IMF's projection of 9.2% economic growth for Ethiopia in 2026 - the highest on the continent - presents a paradox: macroeconomic performance driven by the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam, infrastructure investment, and export growth is proceeding alongside massive internal insecurity. This economic-security paradox makes Ethiopia simultaneously one of Africa's fastest-growing economies and one of its most conflict-affected states.

As of mid-2026, Ethiopia is fighting insurgencies on at least three simultaneous fronts (Amhara, Oromia, and renewed Tigray tensions), managing a deteriorating relationship with Eritrea, navigating contentious elections, and implementing a critically incomplete peace agreement. The ENDF is significantly overstretched. Drone warfare has become the government's primary counterinsurgency tool in both Amhara and Oromia; it is producing tactical results but generating civilian casualties that fuel the recruitment of both Fano and OLA.

Short-Term (0-12 months) High. The June 2026 elections' disputed legitimacy will likely intensify Fano and OLA operations. The Tigray TPLF-federal standoff over the Tigray Government Assembly is a potential trigger for renewed armed conflict. Ethiopia-Eritrea relations remain dangerous; a miscalculation could escalate rapidly. Medium-Term (1-3 years) Ethiopia's medium-term stability depends on whether the political settlement process can address Amhara grievances (particularly Western Tigray), deliver a credible OLA peace process, resolve the Tigray political impasse, and de-escalate the Eritrea confrontation. Each of these is a difficult negotiation in its own right; managing all four simultaneously is an enormous governance challenge.