Eritrea — Africa's Indefinite State: Isaias Afwerki and the System of Permanent National Service

Eritrea is, by virtually every metric, the most thoroughly authoritarian state in Africa and among the most repressive in the world. Since gaining independence from Ethiopia in 1993 following a UN-supervised referendum (99.8% for independence, following a 30-year liberation war), Eritrea has been governed by President Isaias Afwerki and the People’s Front for Democracy and Justice (PFDJ) — the sole legal political party — without a single national election. The constitution ratified in 1997, which included civil and political rights guarantees and term limits, has never been implemented. The National Assembly has not met since 2010. There is no independent judiciary, no independent media (ranked dead last globally by Reporters Without Borders in both 2024 and 2025, described as an ‘information desert’), no independent civic organisations, and no freedom of political, religious, or social organisation outside state structures.

Isaias Afwerki, who turned 80 on February 2, 2026, has governed Eritrea for 33 years without any formal mandate from the population. His political formation was in China during the Maoist Cultural Revolution (1967), and his governance reflects those early experiences: total ideological control, suppression of any competing power centre, distrust of all institutions that might constrain the leader’s authority, and an ideological framework that legitimises permanent mobilisation and sacrifice in terms of national liberation and siege mentality.

The system of indefinite national service — initially announced as an 18-month civic obligation when Eritrea achieved independence — has become the defining structural feature of Eritrean society and the primary vehicle for what the UN Commission of Inquiry described in 2016 as enslavement. Eritrean men and women are conscripted into national service, typically from secondary school, and serve indefinitely at nominal wages that cannot support a family. The service encompasses military deployment (including combat in Ethiopia’s Tigray War), construction and agricultural work, teaching, and various forms of government labour. Eritreans who attempt to flee national service — by crossing the border into Sudan, Ethiopia, or Djibouti — are classified as deserters; their families are subject to collective punishment including arbitrary arrest, confiscation of property, and loss of government benefits. Despite these risks, an estimated 5,000+ Eritreans flee the country each month.

The September 2001 crackdown — when Isaias arrested the ‘G-15,’ a group of eleven senior government and military officials who had written an open letter calling for democratic reforms and free elections — marked the definitive end of any internal reform process. All independent newspapers were shut down simultaneously. The G-15 members have been held incommunicado since their arrest in September 2001; as of 2026, over 24 years later, several are believed to have died in detention while others remain alive but completely isolated. No charges have ever been filed; no trial has ever occurred.

The 2016 UN Commission of Inquiry on Human Rights in Eritrea concluded that there are ‘reasonable grounds to believe that crimes against humanity have been committed in Eritrea since 1991.’ Subsequent reporting by the UN Special Rapporteur has consistently found this to be ongoing. The most recent period covered by a Special Rapporteur report (April 2025–April 2026) concluded that the situation ‘continued to deteriorate’ and that ‘there remain reasonable grounds to believe that crimes against humanity continue in Eritrea.’ The core violations are systematic and widespread: enforced disappearance, prolonged incommunicado detention without charge or trial, torture, and persecution of political opponents, journalists, and members of religious communities.

Eritrea’s regional position has created new tensions in 2025–2026. The 2018 peace deal with Ethiopia — which earned Abiy Ahmed the Nobel Peace Prize — produced a brief period of optimism. But Eritrean troops’ participation in the 2020–2022 Tigray War alongside Ethiopian federal forces (where they committed documented mass atrocities including systematic sexual violence and civilian massacres) fundamentally changed the character of the Eritrea-Ethiopia relationship. As of 2026, Eritrean forces still occupy parts of Ethiopia’s Tigray region and continue to commit abuses. Ethiopia’s public statements about accessing the Red Sea through Eritrean ports have produced a new diplomatic crisis: Eritrea formally rejected Ethiopian demands in a June 2025 letter to the UN, reaffirming absolute sovereignty over its coastline; Ethiopia responded in October 2025 framing its ambitions as compatible with peace while accusing Eritrea of hostile actions.

The Indefinite National Service System

Eritrea’s system of indefinite national service is the defining structural feature of Eritrean society and the primary vehicle for the mass human rights violations the UN has documented. All Eritreans — men and women — are subject to conscription, typically beginning in the final year of secondary school when students are sent to Sawa military training camp. Service was initially mandated at 18 months; in practice, it became indefinite from the early 2000s as the ‘no peace, no war’ stalemate with Ethiopia provided permanent justification for militarisation.

Eritreans in national service receive a nominal stipend (approximately $30-50 per month) that cannot sustain family life. They are assigned to military, construction, agricultural, educational, or administrative roles by state command rather than by choice. Those who refuse to report are subject to arbitrary detention, torture, and their families to collective punishment. Those who attempt to flee (the only realistic exit from the system) risk being shot by border guards or, if caught, indefinite imprisonment under torture.

The UN Commission of Inquiry’s characterisation of national service as ‘enslavement’ reflects the legal criteria: forced labour without meaningful consent, under threat of severe punishment, and with no end date or prospect of voluntary exit. The system has devastated Eritrea’s human capital: the educated class that has managed to flee the country represents a permanent brain drain that has left Eritrea’s development trajectory far below what its demographics would suggest.

The Succession Question

At 80, Isaias Afwerki is among Africa’s oldest heads of state. He has given no indication of succession planning, has not nominated a vice president or designated successor, and has actively eliminated any figure within the PFDJ who might be seen as a potential replacement (the G-15 arrests in 2001 were partly motivated by eliminating precisely such potential successors). Eritrea has no institutional mechanism for peaceful leadership transfer: no elections, no designated succession line, no functioning legislature that might validate a transition.

The scenarios for post-Isaias Eritrea range from controlled succession by inner-circle PFDJ military figures to a dangerous power vacuum and potential armed conflict between competing factions. The Eritrean diaspora’s democratic aspirations would be likely to remain frustrated whatever succession mechanism emerges, since the PFDJ’s survival is premised on preventing any genuine political pluralism. The Ethiopia-Eritrea tension over Red Sea access has added external geopolitical pressure to an already fragile internal succession dynamic.