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Central Africa / Great Lakes·Democratic Republic of the Congo (direct cross-border dimensions: Rwanda; secondary: Uganda, Burundi)

Eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo Conflict (M23 Resurgence)

Also known as: Kivu Conflict (current phase); M23 Rebellion; March 23 Movement Insurgency; AFC/M23 Insurgency

ActiveInsurgency, with significant interstate dimensions; secondary resource-conflict dimensionCentral Africa / Great LakesNovember 2021 – present (M23 originally formed April 2012; dormant 2013–2021)

A resurgent insurgency in eastern DRC by the March 23 Movement (M23) and its political umbrella, the Alliance Fleuve Congo (AFC), with documented Rwandan state backing. Despite the 2025 Washington Accords and Doha Framework Agreement, fighting and partial implementation persist across North and South Kivu.

Background

The conflict's roots lie in the aftermath of the 1994 Rwandan genocide, when an estimated one to two million Hutu refugees, including individuals responsible for the genocide, fled into eastern Zaire (now the DRC), destabilising the region and providing the immediate pretext for Rwanda's 1996 invasion that triggered the First Congo War (1996–1997). The Second Congo War (1998–2003), sometimes termed "Africa's World War," drew in nine African states and an estimated twenty armed groups, and researchers attribute three to five million deaths to the war and its aftermath, predominantly from disease and displacement rather than direct violence, making it among the deadliest conflicts since the Second World War.

A 2002–2003 peace process formally ended the war and installed a transitional government, but eastern DRC, particularly North and South Kivu and Ituri Province, has remained chronically unstable. An estimated 100 or more armed groups have operated in the region in the two decades since, competing over territory, ethnic grievances, and access to mineral wealth in what is generally termed the ongoing "Kivu conflicts."

The Tutsi-led National Congress for the Defence of the People (CNDP) rebelled from 2006 to 2009 over the protection of Congolese Tutsi communities and the unimplemented integration of its fighters into the national army; a peace agreement signed on 23 March 2009 ended that rebellion and later gave the M23 movement its name. In April 2012, former CNDP fighters mutinied, alleging the government had failed to honour the 2009 agreement, and formed the March 23 Movement (M23). The group briefly captured the provincial capital, Goma, in November 2012 before withdrawing under regional and international pressure, and was militarily defeated in 2013 by the Congolese army (FARDC) supported by a reinforced UN Force Intervention Brigade.

M23 remained largely dormant until late 2021, when it resumed attacks in North Kivu. By 2022, the Congolese government, the UN Group of Experts on the DRC, and Western governments were documenting Rwandan state support for the group, including the alleged presence of embedded Rwanda Defence Force personnel, a finding reiterated in subsequent UN reporting through 2024 and 2025. The movement's political wing, the Alliance Fleuve Congo (AFC, or Congo River Alliance), was established in 2023, broadening the insurgency's coalition; since 2025 its public demands have extended to explicit calls for political change in Kinshasa.

Main Actors

Government
Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (President Félix Tshisekedi); Armed Forces of the DRC (FARDC)
Rebel / Insurgent
March 23 Movement (M23) and its political umbrella, the Alliance Fleuve Congo (AFC), led by Corneille Nangaa
Allied pro-government militias
Wazalendo ("patriots") coalition of local self-defence militias; Burundian National Defence Force (deployed in South Kivu)
Other armed groups in the conflict space
Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR); Allied Democratic Forces (ADF, designated by the United States as ISIS-DRC); CODECO and other Ituri-based militias
Foreign governments
Rwanda (documented backer of M23/AFC, consistently denied by Kigali); Uganda (alleged secondary involvement); United States (lead mediator of the Washington track); Qatar (lead mediator of the Doha track)
Regional / international organisations
East African Community (regional force deployed 2022–2023, later withdrawn); Southern African Development Community (SAMIDRC force, 2023–2025); United Nations (MONUSCO, mandate renewed to December 2026); African Union (mediation role under Togolese President Faure Gnassingbé from late 2025)

Drivers

  • Identity and ethnicity: the status, security, and citizenship of Congolese Tutsi communities, contested since the 1990s.
  • Historical grievances: the unimplemented terms of the 2009 and 2013 peace and integration agreements.
  • Natural resources: control of coltan, gold, tin, and tantalum-rich mining areas, notably the Rubaya mine, which the UN estimates supplies over 15 percent of global tantalum and generates roughly $800,000 per month in revenue for M23.
  • External intervention: sustained, UN-documented Rwandan state backing for M23/AFC.
  • Governance: limited Congolese state authority and security-sector capacity across the eastern provinces.
  • Regional rivalry: parallel Rwanda–DRC and Rwanda–Burundi tensions.

Timeline

  1. 1994

    Rwandan genocide triggers mass refugee influx into eastern Zaire.

  2. 1996–1997

    First Congo War.

  3. 1998–2003

    Second Congo War ("Africa's World War"); an estimated 3–5 million deaths.

  4. 2006–2009

    CNDP rebellion in North Kivu.

  5. 23 Mar 2009

    CNDP–DRC peace agreement; its unimplemented terms are later cited by M23 as justification for rebellion.

  6. Apr 2012

    M23 forms following a mutiny by former CNDP fighters.

  7. Nov 2012

    M23 briefly captures Goma.

  8. 2013

    M23 defeated by FARDC and the UN Force Intervention Brigade; movement goes dormant.

  9. Late 2021

    M23 resumes attacks in North Kivu.

  10. 2022–2023

    EAC regional force deployed and later withdrawn; Nairobi Peace Process launched, later collapses.

  11. 2023

    AFC political coalition formed; SADC's SAMIDRC force deployed.

  12. Jan 2025

    M23 captures Goma; SAMIDRC suffers fatalities among South African, Malawian, and Tanzanian personnel.

  13. Feb 2025

    M23 captures Bukavu; UN Security Council Resolution 2773 condemns the offensive.

  14. 27 Jun 2025

    DRC–Rwanda peace agreement initialled in Washington.

  15. 19 Jul 2025

    DRC–AFC/M23 declaration of principles signed in Doha.

  16. 15 Nov 2025

    Doha Framework Agreement, comprising eight implementation protocols, signed by the DRC and AFC/M23.

  17. 4 Dec 2025

    Washington Accords formally signed by Presidents Tshisekedi and Kagame.

  18. Dec 2025

    M23 captures Uvira despite the signed agreements; reports of approximately 400 killed and 200,000 displaced.

  19. 19 Dec 2025

    UN Security Council Resolution 2808 renews the MONUSCO mandate to 20 December 2026.

  20. 17 Jan 2026

    M23 withdraws from Uvira under US pressure.

  21. 28 Jan 2026

    A landslide at the M23-controlled Rubaya coltan mine kills more than 200 people.

  22. 2026 (ongoing)

    Doha talks relocate to Switzerland amid Gulf regional instability; fighting continues intermittently in North and South Kivu; six of the Doha Framework's eight protocols remain unresolved as of mid-2026.

Humanitarian Impact

Approximately 7,000 people are estimated to have been killed in 2025 alone as a direct result of the M23 offensive, in addition to the far larger historical toll of three to five million deaths attributed to the First and Second Congo Wars and their aftermath since 1996. Roughly seven million people remain internally displaced nationally as of 2025–2026; the 2025 M23 offensive alone displaced an estimated 500,000 to four million people, depending on the geographic scope and time window used by different monitoring bodies. The DRC ranks among the world's largest refugee-origin countries, with more than 1.1 million Congolese refugees across the region, concentrated in Uganda, Burundi, and Tanzania. UNICEF documented nearly 600 rape cases in the immediate aftermath of the fall of Goma in early 2025, and sexual violence is widely and consistently documented across the conflict. Goma's airport, a critical humanitarian access point, remained closed for more than a year after its January 2025 capture.

Peace Efforts

  • 2009 CNDP–DRC agreement (precursor; unimplemented terms later cited by M23).
  • 2013 UN Force Intervention Brigade campaign, which militarily ended the first M23 insurgency.
  • 2022 Nairobi Peace Process (EAC-led), which collapsed in 2023.
  • EAC regional force (2022–2023) and SADC's SAMIDRC force (2023–2025): military stabilisation deployments rather than negotiating frameworks; both withdrew without resolving the conflict.
  • Washington track (DRC–Rwanda): the Washington Accords, signed 4 December 2025, cover troop withdrawal, FDLR neutralisation, and a regional minerals-cooperation framework; implementation has stalled, with Rwandan troop withdrawal and FDLR disbandment both unconfirmed as of mid-2026.
  • Doha track (DRC–AFC/M23): the Framework Agreement of 15 November 2025 sets out eight implementation protocols; only the ceasefire-monitoring and prisoner-exchange protocols have been substantively agreed as of mid-2026.
  • African Union mediation, coordinated by five AU co-facilitators under Togolese President Faure Gnassingbé from late 2025, intended to align the EAC- and SADC-linked diplomatic tracks.
  • UN Security Council Resolutions 2773 (February 2025) and 2808 (December 2025, renewing MONUSCO to December 2026).

Current Situation

As of mid-2026, the Washington and Doha agreements remain only partially implemented. M23/AFC retains control of Goma, Bukavu, and substantial territory across North and South Kivu, operating a parallel civil administration. Fighting continues intermittently in Masisi, Walikale, and the South Kivu highlands. Talks between the DRC and AFC/M23, relocated from Doha to Switzerland, resumed in 2026 without a major breakthrough. The United States has linked further diplomatic and economic engagement, including a critical-minerals cooperation framework, to progress on implementation.

Outlook

The conflict's near-term trajectory depends substantially on whether US-led economic incentives, particularly the minerals-for-security framework, can achieve what purely diplomatic and military tracks have not. Analysts caution that M23/AFC's deepening parallel administration in the Kivus makes a negotiated restoration of full Congolese state authority increasingly difficult the longer the present status quo persists. Plausible escalation risks include renewed large-scale offensive action by either side, a full breakdown of the Washington–Doha framework, or a wider Rwanda–Burundi confrontation.

Explore CRCA

Related CRCA Resources

  • ACRI 2026 Democratic Republic of the Congo Country Risk Profile (forthcoming)
  • APCO 2026 Central Africa / Great Lakes Regional Chapter
  • CRCA Commentary archive (forthcoming)

Further Reading

  • Africa Center for Strategic Studies. (2025). The DRC conflict enters a dangerous new phase. africacenter.org
  • Council on Foreign Relations. (2026). Conflict in the Democratic Republic of Congo. Global Conflict Tracker. cfr.org
  • Critical Threats Project. (2025). DRC–M23 Doha peace framework—A long road ahead: Africa File special edition. American Enterprise Institute. criticalthreats.org
  • Human Rights Watch. (2026). End to abuses still distant in DR Congo. hrw.org
  • International Crisis Group. (2026). The M23 offensive: Elusive peace in the Great Lakes (Report No. 320). crisisgroup.org
  • International Crisis Group. (2026). How African diplomacy faltered in Congo—and how it can be revived. crisisgroup.org
  • Mixed Migration Centre. (2026). DR Congo's endless war and its impact on mixed migration in 2025. mixedmigration.org
  • UN Security Council Report. (2026). Democratic Republic of the Congo, March 2026 monthly forecast. securitycouncilreport.org

Citation

Conflict Research, Consulting & Advocacy (CRCA). (2026). Eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo Conflict (M23 Resurgence). In CRCA African Conflict Encyclopedia (2026 ed.). Conflict Research, Consulting & Advocacy. Retrieved from https://crcahub.org

Editorial Metadata

Version
1.0 (Pilot)
Editor
CRCA–ACAN Editorial Team
Status
Pilot entry — full peer review pending
Sources updated
21 June 2026
Next review
December 2026
All entries