Darfur Conflict
Also known as: War in Darfur; the Darfur Genocide; Land Cruiser War; Sudan's second genocide
Two connected cycles of mass atrocity in Darfur — the 2003–2005 genocide carried out by Khartoum-backed Janjaweed militia against Fur, Masalit, and Zaghawa communities, and the RSF-led atrocities since April 2023 that triggered a US genocide determination in January 2025 and the October 2025 fall of El Fasher.
Background
Darfur — a vast, arid region of approximately 500,000 square kilometres in northwestern Sudan, historically home to some eighty distinct ethnic groups — has been the site of two distinct but directly connected cycles of mass atrocity: the genocide of 2003–2005 (and continuing violence thereafter), and the catastrophic new phase of targeted ethnic killings that erupted within the context of the Sudan Civil War from April 2023. These two phases are connected by a continuous organisational lineage: the Janjaweed militia that carried out genocide in Darfur from 2003 was formalised as the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) by President al-Bashir in 2013, and the RSF is the primary perpetrator of the new mass atrocities.
Darfur's structural tensions pre-date the 2003 conflict. The region's communities have historically been divided between sedentary African farming groups — primarily the Fur, Masalit, and Zaghawa — and Arab nomadic pastoralist groups whose seasonal cattle migration routes brought them into periodic conflict with agricultural communities over land, water, and grazing rights. Climate change from the 1970s onward intensified competition for these resources. The central government in Khartoum consistently favoured Arab pastoralist groups in land allocation decisions and law enforcement.
The immediate trigger of the 2003 conflict was armed rebellion. In February 2003, two rebel groups — the Sudan Liberation Army/Movement (SLA/M) and the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) — launched coordinated attacks on government military installations in North Darfur, attacking the El Fasher airbase. The government's response was disproportionate and systematically targeted civilian populations. Rather than deploying the regular Sudanese Armed Forces, the government armed, equipped, and directed Arab militia forces known as the Janjaweed — a term sometimes translated as 'devils on horseback'. The Janjaweed's campaign followed a standard pattern: Sudanese Air Force helicopter gunships and Antonov bombers would attack a village, followed within hours by Janjaweed on camels and horses who would kill men, rape women, abduct children, burn fields, destroy food stores, poison wells, and loot livestock. The targeting was explicitly ethnic.
US Secretary of State Colin Powell testified before Congress on 9 September 2004 that what was occurring in Darfur constituted genocide. The UN Security Council referred the situation to the ICC in March 2005. The ICC issued arrest warrants for Omar al-Bashir in 2009 (war crimes, crimes against humanity) and 2010 (genocide) — the first sitting head of state to be indicted by the ICC. Al-Bashir was never surrendered and remained in power until April 2019. In 2013 Bashir formalised the Janjaweed under Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo (Hemedti) as the RSF — preserving the command relationships and ethnic-targeting culture that would produce the same pattern of killings when the RSF and SAF went to war in April 2023.
Main Actors
- Government of Sudan / al-Bashir regime
- Directed and coordinated the Janjaweed counterinsurgency from 2003. Provided arms, logistics, and air support. Al-Bashir indicted by the ICC for genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity. Remains in Sudan as of mid-2026.
- Janjaweed / Rapid Support Forces (RSF)
- Arab militia armed and directed by Khartoum to carry out counterinsurgency in Darfur. Conducted systematic ethnic cleansing against Fur, Masalit, and Zaghawa communities 2003–2005 and continuing thereafter. Formalised as the RSF under Hemedti in 2013. Primary perpetrator of mass atrocities in Darfur in the 2023–present Sudan Civil War. US genocide determination: January 2025.
- Sudan Liberation Army/Movement (SLA/M)
- Primary rebel group that launched attacks in February 2003, triggering the Janjaweed counterinsurgency. Drew support from Fur, Zaghawa, and Masalit communities. Since fragmented (SLA/Minni Minnawi, SLA/Abdul Wahid). Signed the Juba Peace Agreement (2020). In the 2023 war, SLA/MM aligned with the SAF.
- Justice and Equality Movement (JEM)
- Second major rebel movement, founded by Khalil Ibrahim; ideologically Islamist, drawing primarily from the Zaghawa. Conducted the May 2008 attack on Omdurman. Signed the Doha Agreement (2011); has since fragmented.
- African Union / UNAMID
- AMIS (2004–2007) was the first international peacekeeping deployment to Darfur. Replaced by the UN-AU Hybrid Operation (UNAMID, 2007–2020), the UN's largest-ever peacekeeping mission at peak; withdrew December 2020.
- International Criminal Court (ICC)
- Seized via UNSC Resolution 1593 (March 2005). Issued warrants for al-Bashir, Harun, Kushayb, Hussein, and Abd-Al-Rahman. Ali Kushayb convicted October 2025; sentenced to 20 years December 2025. ICC investigating new atrocities since April 2023.
Drivers
- Climate-driven resource competition between sedentary African farmers and Arab pastoralists
- State favouritism toward Arab communities in land allocation and law enforcement
- Khartoum's reliance on ethnic militias for counterinsurgency
- Impunity and ICC non-enforcement
- Janjaweed-to-RSF institutional continuity
Timeline
1970s–1990s
Advancing desertification intensifies Sahelian drought; government-backed land allocations favour Arab communities; communal violence escalates.
February 2003
SLA/M and JEM launch coordinated attacks on government installations in North Darfur.
2003–2005
Janjaweed counterinsurgency campaign destroys Fur, Masalit, and Zaghawa villages; primary genocide phase.
9 September 2004
US Secretary of State Colin Powell testifies that the violence in Darfur constitutes genocide.
March 2005
UNSC Resolution 1593 refers Darfur to the ICC.
May 2008
JEM attacks Omdurman, Khartoum's twin city — the deepest rebel penetration of the capital.
2009–2010
ICC issues two arrest warrants for al-Bashir, including for genocide; African Union calls on member states not to cooperate.
2011
Doha Document for Peace in Darfur signed with the LJM; largely unimplemented.
2013
Bashir formalises the Janjaweed's largest faction under Hemedti as the Rapid Support Forces.
December 2020
UNAMID withdraws.
August 2020
Juba Peace Agreement signed with the Sudan Revolutionary Front; partially implemented before the October 2021 coup.
April 2019
Al-Bashir overthrown; transitional government commits to ICC cooperation.
April 2023
Sudan Civil War erupts; RSF launches new ethnic-targeting campaigns in West Darfur.
January 2025
US Secretary of State Antony Blinken re-determines that the RSF is committing genocide.
October 2025
RSF captures El Fasher after 18-month siege; UN fact-finding mission documents hallmarks of genocide.
October 2025
ICC convicts Ali Kushayb on 27 counts of war crimes and crimes against humanity.
December 2025
Ali Kushayb sentenced to 20 years' imprisonment.
2026
ICC continues investigation; al-Bashir, Harun, Hussein remain at large in Sudan.
Humanitarian Impact
Darfur's humanitarian toll across its two phases is among the most severe of any single regional conflict in African post-colonial history. The primary genocide phase of 2003–2005 killed an estimated 200,000 to 300,000 people, with violence, famine, and disease contributing in roughly equal measure. By 2008, the UN estimated approximately 300,000 had died and 2.7 million had been displaced. The Janjaweed's systematic destruction of agricultural infrastructure deprived surviving communities of their subsistence base. The 2023–present mass-atrocity phase has produced new mass displacement, targeted killings of Masalit and other non-Arab communities (most severely documented in El Geneina and after the October 2025 fall of El Fasher), and the collapse of humanitarian access across most of Darfur.
Peace Efforts
- Abuja Agreement / Darfur Peace Agreement (May 2006): signed by the government and SLA/Minni Minnawi only; rejected by JEM and SLA/Abdul Wahid; failed to halt the violence.
- Doha Document for Peace in Darfur (July 2011): negotiated between the government and the Liberation and Justice Movement in Qatar; failed to include main rebel factions; largely unimplemented.
- Juba Peace Agreement (August 2020): signed between Sudan's transitional Sovereignty Council and the Sudan Revolutionary Front (JEM, SLA/MM, SPLM-N Malik Agar); offered integration into security forces, transitional seats, and development funds. Partially implemented before the October 2021 coup. SLA/Abdul Wahid and JEM splinters did not sign.
- ICC proceedings (2005–present): the primary international accountability mechanism. The Kushayb conviction (October 2025) is its first result. Al-Bashir, Harun, and Hussein remain at large.
Current Situation
As of mid-2026, Darfur remains the site of an active mass-atrocity phase driven by the RSF in the context of the wider Sudan Civil War. The October 2025 fall of El Fasher after an 18-month siege was followed by UN fact-finding documentation of hallmarks of genocide. The January 2025 US genocide determination against the RSF, and the October 2025 ICC conviction of Ali Kushayb (sentenced to 20 years in December 2025), are the most significant accountability developments — but al-Bashir, Ahmad Harun, and Abdelraheem Hussein remain at large in Sudan. RSF-controlled Darfur continues to face targeted killings of non-Arab communities with no functioning humanitarian access mechanism.
Outlook
Medium-term (1–3 years): Without a political settlement to the Sudan Civil War that addresses the RSF's role and accountability, Darfur will remain under RSF control with continuing mass-atrocity risk. The ICC's ongoing investigation may produce additional warrants but without enforcement these will have limited deterrent effect.
Long-term (3+ years): Darfur's trajectory depends on whether any post-war political settlement in Sudan genuinely addresses the structural drivers of both the 2003 and 2023 cycles: ethnic discrimination in land and political representation, impunity for ethnic-militia violence, and systematic exclusion of Darfuri communities from national power. Past peace agreements (Abuja, Doha, Juba) failed precisely because they offered political accommodation without structural reform.
Explore CRCA
Related CRCA Resources
- APCO 2026 — East Africa & Horn of Africa Sub-Regional Conflict Trends Analysis
- ACRI 2026 — Country Risk Score: Sudan
Further Reading
- Prunier, G. (2005). Darfur: The ambiguous genocide. Cornell University Press.
- Flint, J., & de Waal, A. (2008). Darfur: A new history of a long war (revised edition). Zed Books.
- International Criminal Court (2010, 2025). Prosecutor v. Al Bashir; Prosecutor v. Abd-Al-Rahman (Ali Kushayb). icc-cpi.int
- US Department of State (January 2025). Genocide determination — RSF in Darfur.
- Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect (2026). Sudan. globalr2p.org
Citation
CRCA–ACAN Editorial Team (2026). Darfur Conflict: Genocide, Janjaweed, and the RSF's Origins (2003–Present). In CRCA African Conflict Encyclopedia, Volume I. Conflict Research, Consulting & Advocacy (CRCA) / African Conflict Analyst Network (ACAN). https://crcahub.org/encyclopedia/darfur-conflict
Editorial Metadata
- Version
- 1.0 (Pilot)
- Editor
- CRCA–ACAN Editorial Team
- Status
- Pilot entry — full peer review pending
- Sources updated
- 24 June 2026
- Next review
- December 2026