Chad: Dynastic Succession, Regional Security Anchor, and the Déby Family State

Chad occupies a uniquely complex position in African geopolitics: simultaneously one of the continent’s most strategically important states for regional security — serving as the headquarters of multiple multilateral counterterrorism architectures and the linchpin of Sahelian and Lake Chad Basin security cooperation — and one of its most consistently authoritarian, now in the second generation of Déby family rule following the unexpected death of Idriss Déby Itno on the front lines in April 2021 and his son Mahamat’s consolidation of dynastic power.

Idriss Déby Itno had ruled Chad since 1990, when he overthrew President Hissène Habré in a coup backed by France and Sudan. Over thirty years, he built a rentier security state funded by oil revenues (discovered in 2003) and the proceeds of hosting French military bases and Western counterterrorism partnerships. Under Déby Sr, Chad deployed troops against Boko Haram in the Lake Chad Basin, participated in the G5 Sahel Joint Force, and hosted the headquarters of the Multinational Joint Task Force in N’Djamena. These international roles made Chad’s military indispensable to Western security architectures and provided Déby with sustained Western political support that insulated him from accountability for systematic domestic repression.

Déby Sr’s death was extraordinary. On April 20, 2021 — the day after he won a sixth presidential term — he was killed at the front lines in northern Chad while visiting troops fighting the FACT rebel group (Front for Change and Concord in Chad). His son Mahamat — who commanded the presidential guard and had led UN peacekeeping missions in Mali — was installed as head of a Transitional Military Council within hours. France, which had 5,000+ troops based in Chad under Operation Barkhane and whose president Emmanuel Macron attended Déby Sr’s funeral, immediately endorsed the transition as necessary under ‘exceptional circumstances’, overriding the Chadian constitution’s requirement for the National Assembly speaker to serve as acting president pending elections within 90 days.

The transition process that followed was a gradual, internationally tolerated consolidation of power. The promised 18-month transition was extended to over three years. A constitutional referendum in December 2023 established a framework for elections. In May 2024, Mahamat won a presidential election that his main challenger (Prime Minister Succès Masra) contested as fraudulent; ECOWAS and the Community of Sahel-Saharan States declared it free and fair before counting was complete. Masra was subsequently arrested and sentenced to 20 years in prison. Parliamentary elections in December 2024 gave Déby’s MPS party 124 of 188 seats, with the opposition boycotting.

The October 2025 constitutional amendment was the definitive consolidation move. Chad’s National Assembly, dominated by the MPS, voted to extend the presidential term from five to seven years and remove all term limits — by 171 votes to 0, with the opposition boycotting. The constitutional court confirmed the amendments; Déby promulgated them on October 8, 2025. FIDH and Chadian human rights organisations condemned the move as ‘perpetuation of a dynasty at the head of the state.’ With term limits gone, Mahamat Déby can remain president indefinitely — as his father did for thirty years.

Chad’s geopolitical repositioning since 2021 mirrors the AES juntas’ trajectory but with greater caution. In April 2024, Chad requested that the United States cease operations at Adji Kossei Air Base in N’Djamena. In November 2024, Chad terminated its 60-year defence cooperation agreement with France, resulting in the evacuation of approximately 1,000 French troops. The AES countries gave Chad the ‘green light’ to join their alliance in April 2024, but Chad has not formally done so, maintaining a degree of geopolitical ambiguity. Mahamat Déby visited Moscow in January 2024 — a deliberate signal to the West about his options.

Chad simultaneously faces a catastrophic Sudan refugee crisis. The April 2023 outbreak of war between the RSF and SAF in Sudan drove 1.3 million Sudanese across the border into eastern Chad by April 2026 — the world’s largest single refugee influx of 2024–2026. Combined with long-term Sudanese refugees from prior conflicts and other displaced populations, Chad hosts 1.5 million refugees total, stretching humanitarian capacity and creating significant political and security tensions in eastern provinces.

Regional Security Role

Chad’s historical role as the linchpin of Sahelian and Lake Chad Basin security has been significantly weakened but not eliminated by the 2024–2025 geopolitical repositioning. Chad remains an MNJTF member and contributor — though Déby threatened withdrawal after the October 2024 Boko Haram attack that killed 40+ soldiers. Chad’s military has decades of hard-won experience in the Sahel and Lake Chad Basin that cannot be quickly replicated. The loss of French basing rights and the US departure from Adji Kossei have reduced Western intelligence and operational support significantly, degrading Chad’s counterterrorism capacity.

The Sudan refugee crisis has created a security dimension of its own: eastern Chad now borders Sudan’s active war zone; RSF fighters have reportedly entered Chad mixed with refugees; and the humanitarian pressure on eastern provinces creates localised governance and security challenges. Chad’s eastern region is simultaneously the primary corridor for Sudanese refugee flows and an area with limited state presence and historical ethnic tensions between Arab and non-Arab communities.

Active — Consolidating authoritarianism (October 2025: term limits removed; Mahamat Idriss Déby effectively president for life; opposition leader Succès Masra sentenced to 20 years)

Short-Term (0–12 months)

High. Chad faces simultaneous pressures: a Boko Haram/ISWAP threat in the Lake Chad Basin, a Sudan refugee crisis in the east, elite tensions within the Déby family circle (Adam Déby’s January 2025 letter calling for Mahamat’s resignation), and a weakened counterterrorism architecture following Western force expulsions. The constitutional consolidation removes institutional safety valves for elite discontent.

Long-Term (3+ years)

Chad’s long-term stability under Mahamat Déby depends on his ability to consolidate the military elite’s loyalty, generate sufficient oil-revenue patronage to maintain the Déby political network, and manage the Sudan refugee crisis without triggering ethnic conflict in the east. None of these is guaranteed. The pattern of Déby Sr’s eventual death at rebel hands after 30 years is not an irrelevant historical lesson.