Burundi: The 2015 Crisis, Nkurunziza’s Third Term, and Post-Genocide Fragility (2015–Present)
Burundi’s 2015 crisis was, at its structural core, a collision between the logic of post-genocide power-sharing and the logic of authoritarian consolidation. The Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement of 2000 — which ended a twelve-year civil war that killed approximately 300,000 people — was built around a power-sharing architecture designed to prevent any single ethnic group (Hutu or Tutsi) f.
Background
Burundi’s 2015 crisis was, at its structural core, a collision between the logic of post-genocide power-sharing and the logic of authoritarian consolidation. The Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement of 2000 — which ended a twelve-year civil war that killed approximately 300,000 people — was built around a power-sharing architecture designed to prevent any single ethnic group (Hutu or Tutsi) from monopolising state power. It included presidential term limits (two five-year terms), ethnic quotas in the military and government, and an independent National Independent Electoral Commission. Pierre Nkurunziza, a former rebel commander of the CNDD-FDD who had come to power through the Arusha framework’s 2005 elections, had spent his decade in office systematically dismantling the Arusha agreement’s checks — right up to the moment he announced in April 2015 that he would stand for a third presidential term.
Nkurunziza’s legal justification was that his first term (2005–2010) had been granted by parliament rather than by popular vote, and therefore did not count against the two-term limit. The constitutional court, under significant intimidation, endorsed this argument by four votes to three; the dissenting judges fled the country. Mass street protests broke out in Bujumbura, the capital, and spread across the country. On 13 May 2015, while Nkurunziza was attending an East African Community summit in Tanzania, General Godefroid Niyombare — a former army chief of staff and a figure from within the CNDD-FDD’s own military elite — announced a coup. The coup was suppressed within 48 hours; Nkurunziza returned; the repression that followed was systematic.
Between April and December 2015, and continuing at lower intensity through 2017, government forces, the Imbonerakure youth militia, the National Intelligence Service, and armed groups conducted a campaign of targeted killings, disappearances, torture, sexual violence, and mass arrests against perceived government opponents. The UN Commission of Inquiry on Burundi, established in 2016, found in its 2020 report that potential crimes against humanity had been committed since April 2015. Over 1,200 people were killed; approximately 400,000 fled to Tanzania, Rwanda, the DRC, and Uganda. The East African Community mediation, the African Union’s threatened deployment of a protection force (never realised), and EU sanctions all failed to significantly alter the government’s behaviour.
Nkurunziza’s sudden death from cardiac arrest on 8 June 2020 — three days after his handpicked successor Évariste Ndayishimiye had won the May 2020 presidential election — created an ambiguous transition. Ndayishimiye had himself managed the Imbonerakure at a senior level and was deeply embedded in CNDD-FDD’s security structures. Initial optimism about his openness proved unfounded: while his rhetoric was somewhat less inflammatory than Nkurunziza’s, structural abuses continued — arbitrary arrests of human rights defenders, impunity for 2015 perpetrators, Imbonerakure intimidation — and Burundi’s withdrawal from the International Criminal Court was maintained.
Main Actors
- Actor
- Role and Position
- CNDD-FDD government
- The ruling party, in uninterrupted power since 2005. Originated as a Hutu rebel movement during the civil war; transformed into a political party under the Arusha framework. Has systematically dismantled the Arusha agreement’s checks since 2010.
- Évariste Ndayishimiye
- President since June 2020. Elected May 2020. Former general and senior CNDD-FDD security official; managed the Imbonerakure. Sacked PM Bunyoni in 2022 amid alleged coup plot, signalling internal CNDD-FDD tensions. Rhetoric somewhat more moderate than Nkurunziza; structural abuses continue.
- Imbonerakure
- CNDD-FDD’s youth militia; the primary instrument of street-level repression. Has committed extrajudicial killings, disappearances, sexual violence, and intimidation since 2015. Not formally a state institution, providing the government plausible deniability for its abuses.
- Pierre Nkurunziza (deceased)
- President 2005–2020; died 8 June 2020 (officially cardiac arrest). His third-term bid triggered the 2015 crisis that killed 1,200+ and displaced 400,000+. His decade in power progressively hollowed out the Arusha framework’s protective mechanisms.
- RED Tabara (Résistance pour un État de Droit)
- Armed opposition group operating from the DRC. Remnants of the FNL (Forces for National Liberation) that rearmed in eastern DRC after the 2015 crisis. Conducts periodic cross-border attacks into Burundi. Contributes to ongoing insecurity and provides the government justification for continued securitisation.
- UN Commission of Inquiry (CoI) on Burundi
- Established 2016 by the Human Rights Council; produced a landmark 2020 report documenting potential crimes against humanity since April 2015. Burundi refused access to its territory throughout the CoI’s mandate; Burundi was elected to the Human Rights Council for 2024–2026 despite this refusal.
Timeline
1993–2005
Burundian civil war following assassination of first Hutu president Ndadaye (October 1993). ~300,000 killed over 12 years. Arusha Peace Agreement (2000) creates power-sharing framework. 2005: CNDD-FDD wins elections under Arusha framework.
2010–2014
Nkurunziza re-elected in 2010 amid opposition boycott. Progressively dismantles Arusha checks; attempts (fails by one vote in parliament) to amend constitution in 2014 to remove term limits.
April 2015
Nkurunziza announces third-term candidacy. Constitutional court endorses his candidacy 4-3; dissenting judges flee. Mass protests in Bujumbura. Security forces fire on demonstrators.
13 May 2015
Failed coup: General Niyombare announces Nkurunziza’s removal while president is in Tanzania. Coup collapses within 48 hours. Nkurunziza returns; systematic repression begins.
July 2015
Nkurunziza re-elected with 70% amid boycott by main opposition. Protests continue. Targeted killings, disappearances, torture of perceived opponents by Imbonerakure and security forces.
2015–2017
Low-intensity conflict: ~1,200 killed, 10,000 arbitrarily detained, 400,000+ refugees. UN Commission of Inquiry established 2016.
2018
Constitutional referendum: term limits removed, allowing Nkurunziza to potentially rule until 2034. Burundi formally withdraws from ICC, becoming the first country to do so.
May–June 2020
Ndayishimiye elected president (May 20). Nkurunziza dies suddenly (June 8; official: cardiac arrest). Ndayishimiye sworn in June 18.
2020–2022
Initial cautious optimism; some political prisoners released. Structural abuses continue; Imbonerakure active. Ndayishimiye fires PM Bunyoni (alleged coup plot) October 2022, signalling CNDD-FDD internal tensions.
2024–2025
Amnesty International’s August 2024 report: four years into Ndayishimiye’s presidency, repression of civic space continues unabated. January 2026 Amnesty 10th anniversary report: 10 years of impunity for 2015 crimes; Imbonerakure still active; opposition barred.
5 June 2025
Legislative and municipal elections: CNDD-FDD claims 96%+ of vote; key opposition leaders including Agathon Rwasa barred from participation. Constitutional Court confirms results.
2026–2027
Presidential elections scheduled for 2027. Ndayishimiye eligible to stand again. Political space remains closed. RED Tabara conducting cross-border attacks from DRC.
Humanitarian Impact
The 2015 crisis produced immediate humanitarian consequences: 1,200+ deaths, 10,000 arbitrary detentions, and approximately 400,000 refugees. The UN Commission of Inquiry’s 2020 finding that potential crimes against humanity had been committed since April 2015 — including extrajudicial killings, disappearances, sexual violence, torture, and the instrumentalisation of ethnic identity to justify political violence — represents one of the most significant UN human rights findings on Burundi since the civil war.
A decade after the crisis, the structural conditions that enabled it remain intact: the Imbonerakure still operates with impunity; perpetrators of 2015 violence have not been prosecuted; civil society and independent media remain suppressed; and Burundians who fled in 2015 face an uncertain environment for return. Burundi ranks among the world’s poorest countries, with chronically insufficient public services and high food insecurity. The BTI 2026 describes institutions as ‘militarised’ and notes that human rights violations continue and alternative political views are repressed.
Current Situation
As of mid-2026, Burundi presents a paradox of surface stability and structural fragility. The country has not experienced the acute violence of 2015–2017 since Ndayishimiye’s accession. But the CNDD-FDD’s political monopoly is firmer than ever: the June 2025 legislative elections with 96% returns, the barring of key opposition, and the continued functioning of the Imbonerakure indicate a system that has consolidated its control rather than reformed it. The 2027 presidential elections, with Ndayishimiye eligible for another term, are the next major political inflection point.
Outlook
Short-Term (0–12 months)
Medium-High. The structural conditions for mass atrocity — documented by the UN CoI — remain present: the Imbonerakure’s continued operation, impunity for 2015 crimes, and suppression of civil society. A political crisis triggered by elite competition within CNDD-FDD — as previewed by the Bunyoni firing in 2022 — could rapidly produce renewed large-scale violence.
Long-Term (3+ years)
Long-term stabilisation in Burundi requires genuine accountability for 2015 crimes, the restoration of the Arusha Agreement’s power-sharing safeguards, and the demobilisation of the Imbonerakure. None of these conditions are present in the current political order.
Explore CRCA
Related CRCA Resources
- APCO 2026 — Sub-Regional Conflict Trends Analysis
- ACRI 2026 — Country Risk Score: Burundi: The 2015 Crisis, Nkurunziza’s Third Term, and Post-Genocide Fragility (2015–Present)
Further Reading
- Amnesty International. (2026, January). Ten years on: Reflections on the silent crisis in Burundi. https://www.amnesty.org
- Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect. (2026). Burundi. https://www.globalr2p.org/countries/burundi/
- Human Rights Watch. (2021, May). April 2015–June 2020: A chronology of repression of media and civil society in Burundi. https://www.hrw.org
- International Crisis Group. (2015). Burundi’s coup from within. https://www.crisisgroup.org/rpt/africa/burundi/burundis-coup-within
- BTI 2026 Burundi Country Report. https://bti-project.org/en/reports/country-report/BDI
- UN Human Rights Council Commission of Inquiry on Burundi. (2020). Final report. A/HRC/45/CRP.1.
- Reyntjens, F. (2017). Political governance in post-genocide Rwanda. Cambridge University Press. [comparative Burundi analysis]
Citation
CRCA–ACAN Editorial Team (2026). Burundi: The 2015 Crisis, Nkurunziza’s Third Term, and Post-Genocide Fragility. In CRCA African Conflict Encyclopedia, Volume I. Conflict Research, Consulting & Advocacy (CRCA) / African Conflict Analyst Network (ACAN). https://crcahub.org/encyclopedia/burundi
Editorial Metadata
- Version
- 1.0 (Pilot)
- Editor
- CRCA–ACAN Editorial Team
- Status
- Pilot entry — full peer review pending
- Sources updated
- 28 August 2026
- Next review
- December 2026