Boko Haram
Also known as: Jama'tu Ahlis Sunna Lidda'awati wal-Jihad (JAS / JASDJ) — 'People Committed to the Propagation of the Prophet's Teachings and Jihad'
The surviving JAS faction of the original Boko Haram movement, founded by Mohammed Yusuf in Maiduguri and reconstituted under Bakura Doro after Shekau's 2021 death. Resurging across Borno State and Cameroon's Far North in 2024–2026 alongside its rival ISWAP.
Background
Boko Haram is among the most discussed and least well understood armed groups in Africa — partly because the name 'Boko Haram' is a derogatory Hausa nickname meaning roughly 'Western education is forbidden' applied by opponents and then adopted internationally, rather than the organisation's own name. Officially Jama'tu Ahlis Sunna Lidda'awati wal-Jihad (JAS or JASDJ), the organisation has undergone so many mutations, fractures, rebranding, and reconstitutions since its 2009 armed uprising that the 'Boko Haram' label now refers to a specific post-2021 faction that should be analytically distinguished from its ISWAP offshoot.
The organisation was founded in the early 2000s in Maiduguri, Borno State, by Mohammed Yusuf, a charismatic preacher who combined Salafist theology with anti-Western education rhetoric and populist appeal in one of Nigeria's poorest and most marginalised regions. The July 2009 Maiduguri uprising was the conflict's violent catalyst. Yusuf was captured and extrajudicially executed by police; rather than ending the movement, his killing martyred him and drove a radicalised remnant underground under Abubakar Shekau's command.
The 2013–2016 period was Boko Haram's period of greatest territorial control and international infamy. In April 2014 it kidnapped 276 schoolgirls from Chibok, generating the global #BringBackOurGirls campaign. In August 2014 Shekau declared a 'caliphate'; at its peak Boko Haram controlled territory approximately the size of Belgium. A Nigerian-led multinational coalition offensive in 2015 reversed these gains. The 2016 split between Shekau and the IS-designated ISWAP faction permanently divided the movement. In May 2021 ISWAP invaded the Sambisa Forest; Shekau detonated a suicide vest to avoid capture. ISWAP absorbed much of Shekau's territory and fighters; a smaller JAS faction survived under Sahalaba briefly then Bakura Doro from May 2022.
Boko Haram under Bakura Doro has resurged since 2024–2025, conducting increasingly sophisticated attacks and expanding into Cameroon's Far North. A May 2025 massacre of approximately 100 residents of Mallam Karamti and Kwatandashi villages in Borno — targeting ISWAP informants — demonstrated JAS's continued operational capacity. JAS was responsible for 101 of 144 documented attacks in Cameroon's Far North during July–August 2025.
Main Actors
- JAS / Boko Haram
- Surviving faction of the original Boko Haram movement. Led by Bakura Doro since May 2022. Operates primarily in southern Borno State, the Sambisa Forest, and Lake Chad Basin islands. Distinct from ISWAP and periodically in armed conflict with it.
- ISWAP
- Rival faction, now dominant in the Lake Chad Basin. See ISWAP entry for full analysis.
- Nigerian Armed Forces & CJTF
- Nigeria's military operations in the northeast, supported by the Civilian Joint Task Force — a community-based self-defence force in Borno. CJTF effective in some areas but accused of extrajudicial killings. The 'super camp' strategy has been criticised for ceding territory to insurgents.
- Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF)
- Nigeria, Cameroon, Chad, Niger, and Benin. Established 1994; activated against Boko Haram 2014. Effectiveness degraded by Niger's withdrawal (March 2025), strained bilateral relations, and resource constraints.
- Borno State Government
- Governor Babagana Zulum has been an active voice calling for increased military resources and has led a counter-insurgency strategy that includes large-scale civilian resettlement and amnesty programmes for surrendering fighters.
Drivers
- Economic marginalisation and youth unemployment in northeast Nigeria
- Historical state neglect of Borno State and the Lake Chad Basin
- Inter-jihadist competition with ISWAP
- Cross-border sanctuary across porous Lake Chad frontiers
- MNJTF degradation following Niger's 2025 withdrawal
Timeline
Early 2000s
Mohammed Yusuf founds JAS in Maiduguri; combines Salafist theology with rejection of Western education.
July 2009
Maiduguri uprising; security forces kill Yusuf extrajudicially. Shekau rebuilds movement underground.
2010–2013
Systematic attacks on security forces, churches, and government institutions escalate. US designates Boko Haram FTO (2013).
April 2014
Chibok schoolgirl kidnapping: 276 girls seized; international #BringBackOurGirls campaign.
August 2014
Shekau declares 'caliphate'; group controls territory the size of Belgium.
March 2015
Boko Haram pledges allegiance to Islamic State; renamed ISWAP.
2015–2016
Nigeria-led coalition drives the group from most territory; Shekau retreats to Sambisa.
August 2016
IS endorses Abu Musab al-Barnawi as ISWAP leader; Shekau refuses; JAS/ISWAP split formalised.
May 2021
ISWAP invades Sambisa Forest; Shekau detonates suicide vest. JAS reconstituted under Sahalaba.
May 2022
Bakura Doro takes command of JAS following a violent internal power struggle.
2024–2025
JAS/Boko Haram resurges across Borno State and Cameroon's Far North; 101 of 144 Cameroon Far North attacks (July–August 2025).
15 May 2025
JAS massacre: ~100 residents of Mallam Karamti and Kwatandashi villages killed as alleged ISWAP informants.
November 2025
At least 402 people — mostly schoolchildren — kidnapped across four northern Nigerian states; multiple armed groups implicated.
December 2025
US military launches airstrikes against IS-linked targets in northwestern Sokoto State.
16 May 2026
US-Nigeria joint operation kills ISWAP senior leader Abu-Bilal al-Minuki; 175 militants killed.
Humanitarian Impact
Boko Haram's 17-year insurgency has produced one of the most severe and sustained humanitarian crises in sub-Saharan Africa. Over 35,000 people have been killed in the Lake Chad Basin insurgency since 2009 (combining JAS and ISWAP). Approximately 2.9 million people are internally displaced in the Lake Chad Basin, with 2.3 million in Nigeria alone (OCHA, June 2025). Over 1,827 schools have been closed, affecting millions of children. Sexual violence, mass abductions, and recruitment of child soldiers have been systematic.
The November 2025 abduction of 402 schoolchildren across four Nigerian states — surpassing the 2014 Chibok kidnapping in scale — represents a shocking resurgence of mass-abduction tactics. The January 2026 abduction of 160 worshippers and the February 2026 Kwara State attack killing 160 people indicate violence in northern Nigeria is spreading beyond the traditional northeast conflict zone.
Peace Efforts
- Borno State amnesty and resettlement programmes under Governor Babagana Zulum (2021–present): combination of military pressure, large-scale amnesty, and civilian resettlement; the most effective domestic counterterrorism strategy in the region, though reversed in part by the 2025 ISWAP/JAS resurgence.
- MNJTF (2014–present): five-nation multinational force; significantly degraded by Niger's March 2025 withdrawal and strained bilateral relations.
Current Situation
As of mid-2026, Boko Haram under Bakura Doro is assessed as a resurging but still subordinate threat relative to ISWAP. The two groups compete for territory and recruits in the Lake Chad Basin, periodically fight each other, and occasionally overlap operationally against common enemies. JAS's resurgence in 2024–2025 has complicated Nigerian counterterrorism strategy, which had been primarily focused on ISWAP. Niger's withdrawal from the MNJTF has degraded collective security, creating operational vacuums along the Niger-Nigeria border that both ISWAP and JAS have exploited.
Outlook
Short-term (0–12 months): Medium-High. JAS attacks in Borno State and Cameroon's Far North will continue. The November 2025 wave of mass abductions may presage renewed large-scale kidnapping campaigns. The MNJTF's degraded state and Nigeria's resource constraints limit near-term counterterrorism effectiveness.
Long-term (3+ years): Long-term reduction of the Boko Haram threat requires political solutions — economic inclusion for northeast Nigeria's youth, genuine accountability for historical atrocities, and the de-politicisation of the CJTF — alongside credible military pressure. The Borno State government's community-based approach under Governor Zulum is the most promising existing model, but lacks the national resources to be fully implemented.
Explore CRCA
Related CRCA Resources
- APCO 2026 — West Africa and Sahel Sub-Regional Conflict Trends Analysis
- ACRI 2026 — Country Risk Score: Nigeria
Further Reading
- ISPI (2025, July 17). Burn the camps: Jihadist resurgence in the Lake Chad Basin. ispionline.it
- The New Humanitarian (2026, March). Resurgent jihadist violence in northeast Nigeria part of a worrying regional trend. thenewhumanitarian.org
- Al Jazeera (2026, May 18). How ISWAP and Boko Haram are reshaping the Lake Chad Basin. aljazeera.com
- The Conversation (2026, May 13). Boko Haram on the rise again in Nigeria: how it's survived and how to weaken it. theconversation.com
- Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect (2026). Nigeria. globalr2p.org
- Council on Foreign Relations (2026). Violent extremism in the Sahel. Global Conflict Tracker.
- Thurston, A. (2017). Boko Haram: The history of an African jihadist movement. Princeton University Press.
- Matfess, H. (2017). Women and the War on Boko Haram: Wives, weapons and witnesses. Zed Books.
Citation
CRCA–ACAN Editorial Team (2026). Boko Haram: Origins, Fragmentation, and Islamist Insurgency in Northeast Nigeria. In CRCA African Conflict Encyclopedia, Volume I. Conflict Research, Consulting & Advocacy (CRCA) / African Conflict Analyst Network (ACAN). https://crcahub.org/encyclopedia/boko-haram
Editorial Metadata
- Version
- 1.0 (Pilot)
- Editor
- CRCA–ACAN Editorial Team
- Status
- Pilot entry — full peer review pending
- Sources updated
- 24 June 2026
- Next review
- December 2026