Libyan Political Agreement (Skhirat Agreement)
Also known as: Skhirat Agreement
Created the Government of National Accord and Presidency Council to reunify Libya's rival authorities; never ratified by the eastern parliament, it presided over continued division and was superseded by the LPDF roadmap and 2021 GNU.
Conflict Background
Libya's post-2014 split into rival parliaments and governments prompted a UN-brokered compromise signed at Skhirat by delegations of both bodies — but crucially not by the commanders and factions holding coercive power.
Negotiation Context
The LPA's design placed a nine-member Presidency Council atop unreconciled institutions, with the army command question — General Haftar's status — deliberately unresolved; that omission structured the next five years of conflict.
Parties
- Members of the House of Representatives (Tobruk)
- Members of the General National Congress (Tripoli)
- Independents and municipal figures
Mediators & Guarantors
- · UNSMIL (Bernardino León, Martin Kobler)
- · United Nations
- · International community (Rome/Vienna processes)
Key Provisions
Implementation
Superseded by the LPDF outcomes and the 2020 ceasefire architecture, though its institutional creations (HCS; recognition frameworks) continue to shape Libya's protracted transition impasse.
Timeline
- 2015-12-17Signed at Skhirat
- 2016-03GNA installed in Tripoli under naval escort
- 2016–2018HoR withholds endorsement; parallel eastern government persists
- 2019-04Haftar's LNA offensive on Tripoli buries the LPA framework
- 2021-03Superseded: LPDF roadmap installs the GNU
Challenges
- Signature by individuals rather than empowered institutions
- Military command question deferred at design stage
- Regional powers armed rival camps throughout implementation
Outcomes
- Created the internationally recognised executive that anchored subsequent processes
- Its HoR–HCS dual-chamber formula still defines Libya's negotiation geometry
Lessons
- Security questions cannot be sequenced after legitimacy questions
- Individual signatures do not bind institutions
- External proxy competition must be addressed in the agreement, not around it
Related CRCA Resources
References
- Libyan Political Agreement (Skhirat, 2015).
- UNSMIL reporting 2015–2021.
